aiqbench analysis
This research introduces RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework that detects harmful behaviors in Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) LLMs by analyzing low-level GPU execution telemetry rather than relying on sensitive user prompts or model internals. By leveraging hardware-observable signals from expert-routing patterns, the method effectively balances safety verification with user privacy while demonstrating strong generalization across diverse open-source models.
RouteScan: A Non-Intrusive Approach to Auditing MoE LLMs Safety via Expert Routing Telemetry
arXiv:2605.24817v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted for scaling Large Language Models (LLMs), safety auditing becomes necessary to verify whether these models produce or facilitate harmful behaviors during operation. However, existing content-based auditing methods typically require access to user prompts, model internals, or outputs, potentially exposing sensitive user information and creating a tension between LLM safety and user privacy. On the other hand, we observe that, in MoE models, different inputs induce different sparse expert-routing patterns, which produce measurable footprints in low-level GPU execution telemetry. We refer to these hardware-observable signals induced by expert-routing decisions as expert routing telemetry; they are derived from GPU execution rather than from router logits or token-level routing assignments. Inspired by this observation, we propose RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework for detecting harmful behaviors through such routing-induced GPU telemetry. Specifically, RouteScan utilizes the number of active GPU threads allocated to expert modules during the prefilling phase as a discriminative micro-architectural fingerprint, and builds a lightweight detection pipeline that isolates cross-domain invariant risk indicators for the precise identification of malicious prompts. Comprehensive evaluations on four open-source MoE LLMs with distinct routing designs demonstrate that RouteScan achieves strong generalization, with an AUROC exceeding 0.91 on unseen harmful domains. Moreover, privacy stress tests show that, although aggregated execution telemetry retains input-related attribute information, full prompts and exact sensitive fields cannot be reliably recovered under the evaluated attacks.
Abstract:As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted for scaling Large Language Models (LLMs), safety auditing becomes necessary to verify whether these models produce or facilitate harmful behaviors during operation. However, existing content-based auditing methods typically require access to user prompts, model internals, or outputs, potentially exposing sensitive user information and creating a tension between LLM safety and user privacy. On the other hand, we observe that, in MoE models, different inputs induce different sparse expert-routing patterns, which produce measurable footprints in low-level GPU execution telemetry. We refer to these hardware-observable signals induced by expert-routing decisions as expert routing telemetry; they are derived from GPU execution rather than from router logits or token-level routing assignments. Inspired by this observation, we propose RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework for detecting harmful behaviors through such routing-induced GPU telemetry. Specifically, RouteScan utilizes the number of active GPU threads allocated to expert modules during the prefilling phase as a discriminative micro-architectural fingerprint, and builds a lightweight detection pipeline that isolates cross-domain invariant risk indicators for the precise identification of malicious prompts. Comprehensive evaluations on four open-source MoE LLMs with distinct routing designs demonstrate that RouteScan achieves strong generalization, with an AUROC exceeding 0.91 on unseen harmful domains. Moreover, privacy stress tests show that, although aggregated execution telemetry retains input-related attribute information, full prompts and exact sensitive fields cannot be reliably recovered under the evaluated attacks.
11 pages. Revised manuscript with expanded experiments
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Hardware Architecture (cs.AR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2605.24817 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.24817v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.24817 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 339 words
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