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This research establishes a theoretical boundary for detecting LLM-generated text when it is mixed with human edits, demonstrating that detection becomes impossible beyond a specific contamination threshold. The study proposes clipping likelihood-ratio tests as a practical modification to existing detectors, which significantly improves robustness against adversarial attacks while maintaining low false-positive rates. These findings are critical for developing reliable content moderation systems in an era of increasingly sophisticated text manipulation techniques.
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Robust Detection of LLM-Generated Text under Contamination

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.29935v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the detection of LLM-generated text under editing and contamination. Modeling human and machine text as finite-order Markov processes with Huber contamination, we characterize an exact boundary for reliable detection under our assumptions. Detection is impossible when contamination is sufficiently large relative to clean-source separation. Below this boundary, a collection of clipped likelihood-ratio tests achieves vanishing worst-case errors. This construction motivates clipping as a simple modification of existing statistical detectors. For a broad class of additive scores, we identify conditions under which the clipped test is consistent while the raw test's worst-case power tends to zero. We evaluate seven detectors across three datasets and three generation models, and on the RAID benchmark. Clipping improves robustness in both studies, with gains varying across detectors and contamination settings. For example, at a target false-positive rate of 5\%, clipping improves the log-likelihood--log-rank ratio (LRR) detector's true-positive rate by a median of 8.3 percentage points in the controlled study and 2.1 and 4.3 points in rate- and attack-specific RAID evaluations, respectively.

Abstract:We study the detection of LLM-generated text under editing and contamination. Modeling human and machine text as finite-order Markov processes with Huber contamination, we characterize an exact boundary for reliable detection under our assumptions. Detection is impossible when contamination is sufficiently large relative to clean-source separation. Below this boundary, a collection of clipped likelihood-ratio tests achieves vanishing worst-case errors. This construction motivates clipping as a simple modification of existing statistical detectors. For a broad class of additive scores, we identify conditions under which the clipped test is consistent while the raw test's worst-case power tends to zero. We evaluate seven detectors across three datasets and three generation models, and on the RAID benchmark. Clipping improves robustness in both studies, with gains varying across detectors and contamination settings. For example, at a target false-positive rate of 5\%, clipping improves the log-likelihood--log-rank ratio (LRR) detector's true-positive rate by a median of 8.3 percentage points in the controlled study and 2.1 and 4.3 points in rate- and attack-specific RAID evaluations, respectively.

Machine Learning (stat.ML); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2609.29935 [stat.ML]

(or arXiv:2609.29935v1 [stat.ML] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.29935 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 265 words

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