Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Safety

aiqbench analysis

This research introduces ICER, a black-box framework that automates red-teaming for text-to-image models by combining LLM-based prompt rewriting with in-context experience replay to bypass safety filters while preserving harmful intent. The method demonstrates significant transferability to commercial systems like DALL-E 3 and Midjourney, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in current generative AI defenses against automated attacks.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Red-Teaming Text-to-Image Models via In-Context Experience Replay and Semantic-Preserving Prompt Rewriting

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2411.16769v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Understanding the capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models in harmful content generation is essential to safety and compliance. However, human red-teaming is costly and inconsistent, driving the need for automatic tools that simulate realistic misuse attempts. Existing methods either require white-box access, fail to generalize across defenses, or produce uninterpretable adversarial tokens, while generating fluent prompts that preserve the original harmful intent remains underexplored despite its practical relevance. We propose ICER, a black-box framework that addresses this gap through two components: an LLM-based rewriter that produces fluent, natural-language adversarial prompts, and in-context experience replay that accumulates successful jailbreaking patterns into a reusable prior. These components are integrated via bandit optimization, enabling ICER to efficiently balance exploiting proven attack strategies with exploring new ones. Experiments across six safety mechanisms show that ICER outperforms seven baselines under both standard and semantics-preserving evaluation, with over 30% of generated prompts transferring to commercial systems like DALL-E 3 and Midjourney.

Abstract:Understanding the capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models in harmful content generation is essential to safety and compliance. However, human red-teaming is costly and inconsistent, driving the need for automatic tools that simulate realistic misuse attempts. Existing methods either require white-box access, fail to generalize across defenses, or produce uninterpretable adversarial tokens, while generating fluent prompts that preserve the original harmful intent remains underexplored despite its practical relevance. We propose ICER, a black-box framework that addresses this gap through two components: an LLM-based rewriter that produces fluent, natural-language adversarial prompts, and in-context experience replay that accumulates successful jailbreaking patterns into a reusable prior. These components are integrated via bandit optimization, enabling ICER to efficiently balance exploiting proven attack strategies with exploring new ones. Experiments across six safety mechanisms show that ICER outperforms seven baselines under both standard and semantics-preserving evaluation, with over 30% of generated prompts transferring to commercial systems like DALL-E 3 and Midjourney.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)

arXiv:2411.16769 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2411.16769v4 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.16769 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 260 words

Related coverage