Skip to content
aiqbench takeQuantum Computing

aiqbench analysis

This paper challenges the instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics by arguing that, under scientific realism, the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures are ontologically inequivalent rather than merely empirically equivalent. The author posits that "descriptors" in the Heisenberg framework offer a richer, locally separable ontology capable of explaining phenomena like superdense coding and Bell inequality violations more fully than standard wave function formalism.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Realism and the Inequivalence of the Two Quantum Pictures

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2510.02138v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The standard claim that the Schr\"odinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics are equivalent rests on the fact that they yield identical empirical predictions. This equivalence therefore assumes the instrumentalist worldview in which theories serve only as tools for prediction. Under scientific realism, by contrast, theories aim to describe reality. Whereas the Schr\"odinger picture posits a time-evolving wave function, the Heisenberg picture posits so-called descriptors, time-evolving generators of the algebra of observables. These two structures are non-isomorphic: descriptors surject onto but do not reduce to the Schr\"odinger state. Hence, under realism, the pictures are inequivalent. I argue that this inequivalence marks an opening toward a richer, separable ontology for quantum theory. On explanatory grounds, descriptors provide genuinely local accounts of superdense coding, teleportation, branching, and Bell inequality violations -- phenomena that the Schr\"odinger framework does not explain fully locally.

Abstract:The standard claim that the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics are equivalent rests on the fact that they yield identical empirical predictions. This equivalence therefore assumes the instrumentalist worldview in which theories serve only as tools for prediction. Under scientific realism, by contrast, theories aim to describe reality. Whereas the Schrödinger picture posits a time-evolving wave function, the Heisenberg picture posits so-called descriptors, time-evolving generators of the algebra of observables. These two structures are non-isomorphic: descriptors surject onto but do not reduce to the Schrödinger state. Hence, under realism, the pictures are inequivalent. I argue that this inequivalence marks an opening toward a richer, separable ontology for quantum theory. On explanatory grounds, descriptors provide genuinely local accounts of superdense coding, teleportation, branching, and Bell inequality violations -- phenomena that the Schrödinger framework does not explain fully locally.

arXiv:2510.02138 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2510.02138v2 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2510.02138 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 228 words

Related coverage