aiqbench analysis
This paper introduces RAG-PIBench, a rigorous benchmark designed to evaluate prompt-injection detection in Retrieval-Augmented Generation systems using a leakage-aware methodology. The study highlights that lightweight models like DistilBERT outperform complex transformers on protected-test sets, suggesting strong sparse baselines are sufficient for securing RAG pipelines against embedded attacks.
RAG-PIBench: A Leakage-Aware Benchmark for Prompt-Injection Detection in Trustworthy RAG Systems
arXiv:2610.08571v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks embedded in retrieved content. We introduce RAG-PIBench, a benchmark for RAG-style prompt-injection detection containing 4,876 contextual examples across frozen train, validation, and protected-test splits. Using a leakage-aware construction pipeline and strict evaluation protocol, we compare keyword-based, semantic-reference, TF-IDF, and transformer-based detectors. DistilBERT achieves the best protected-test performance (F1 = 0.896, PR-AUC = 0.968), while TF-IDF SVM and logistic regression remain competitive. Our results demonstrate the value of leakage-aware benchmark design and strong sparse baselines for reliable prompt-injection detection in RAG systems.
Abstract:Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks embedded in retrieved content. We introduce RAG-PIBench, a benchmark for RAG-style prompt-injection detection containing 4,876 contextual examples across frozen train, validation, and protected-test splits. Using a leakage-aware construction pipeline and strict evaluation protocol, we compare keyword-based, semantic-reference, TF-IDF, and transformer-based detectors. DistilBERT achieves the best protected-test performance (F1 = 0.896, PR-AUC = 0.968), while TF-IDF SVM and logistic regression remain competitive. Our results demonstrate the value of leakage-aware benchmark design and strong sparse baselines for reliable prompt-injection detection in RAG systems.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.08571 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.08571v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.08571 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 191 words
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