aiqbench analysis
The article addresses the immediate threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, emphasizing that organizations must initiate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migrations now rather than waiting for quantum computers to become operational. This shift transforms quantum resilience from a theoretical future concern into a critical current issue affecting architecture, procurement, and investment strategies across government and enterprise sectors.
Quantum risk starts before quantum computers can break encryption

GUEST OPINION: Somewhere today, sensitive encrypted information taken from a government agency, business, or critical infrastructure operator may already be sitting in an adversary’s archive. They may not be able to read it yet. They may simply be waiting for the technology that will let them. This is the challenge behind harvest now, decrypt later, and it is one reason quantum computing can no longer be treated simply as a future cybersecurity problem. Quantum computers capable of breaking widely used forms of public-key cryptography are not yet available, and the precise timing of that capability remains uncertain. However, uncertainty about arrival should not obscure a more immediate reality: sensitive information may…
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