Quantum Cryptography and Autoformalization in Lean

Abstract:Quantum key distribution provides secure communication by relying on physics principles and mathematical reasoning. Security proofs across the field can contain gaps, often between individually valid theorems integrated under mismatched assumptions. We produce an end-to-end security theorem formalized in the Lean proof assistant, eliminating hidden hypotheses by building only on Lean's standard axioms. Our proof covers composable security of the entanglement-based qubit BB84 protocol against coherent attacks by the postselection technique, accounting for finite block size, and is written in a language that enforces local operations and classical communication to help ensure a faithful representation of the protocol. The proof itself was enabled by LLM-based autoformalization, and with the proof complete, we used the same pipeline as a discovery machine, reducing the finite-size penalty on the key rate. Our work sets a reproducible standard for security arguments in quantum cryptography and shows how formal proof engines can accelerate discovery across quantum information science.

arXiv:2610.17286 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2610.17286v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.17286 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.