aiqbench analysis
This paper advances the field of quantum cryptography by detailing improved quantum key-recovery attacks on two specific Feistel-type block ciphers. The authors demonstrate significant reductions in time complexity for breaking New Structure IV and LBlock under the quantum chosen-plaintext attack model, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in symmetric encryption against future quantum threats.
Quantum Cryptanalysis on Two Feistel-Type Constructions
arXiv:2610.27506v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, the security of traditional cryptographic systems is facing significant challenges. As a fundamental component of symmetric cryptography, block ciphers have attracted increasing attention regarding their quantum security in recent years. In this paper, we propose new quantum attacks on two Feistel-type constructions, i.e., New Structure IV and the lightweight block cipher LBlock, under the quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) model. First, we construct an 8-round quantum distinguisher for New Structure IV and perform an $r(r>12)$-round quantum key-recovery attack. Compared with Li et al.'s qCPA-based result presented at INSCRYPT 2024, our attack reduces the time complexity by a factor of $2^{n/2}$, where $n$ denotes the subkey length. Second, we design a 9-round quantum distinguisher for LBlock and extend it to an $r(r>15)$-round quantum key-recovery attack. The proposed quantum distinguisher covers one more round than Liu et al.'s automated-search distinguisher at ASIACRYPT 2025, which results in a $2^{16}$ reduction in the time complexity of our $r$-round quantum key-recovery attack on LBlock. Furthermore, by analyzing the structure of the round function and the key scheduling of LBlock, we reduce the subkey guess space for the 15-round attack from 76 bits to 52 bits, lowering the time complexity from \(O(2^{38})\) to \(O(2^{26})\) by a factor of \(2^{12}\).
Abstract:With the rapid advancement of quantum computing, the security of traditional cryptographic systems is facing significant challenges. As a fundamental component of symmetric cryptography, block ciphers have attracted increasing attention regarding their quantum security in recent years. In this paper, we propose new quantum attacks on two Feistel-type constructions, i.e., New Structure IV and the lightweight block cipher LBlock, under the quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) model. First, we construct an 8-round quantum distinguisher for New Structure IV and perform an $r(r>12)$-round quantum key-recovery attack. Compared with Li et al.'s qCPA-based result presented at INSCRYPT 2024, our attack reduces the time complexity by a factor of $2^{n/2}$, where $n$ denotes the subkey length. Second, we design a 9-round quantum distinguisher for LBlock and extend it to an $r(r>15)$-round quantum key-recovery attack. The proposed quantum distinguisher covers one more round than Liu et al.'s automated-search distinguisher at ASIACRYPT 2025, which results in a $2^{16}$ reduction in the time complexity of our $r$-round quantum key-recovery attack on LBlock. Furthermore, by analyzing the structure of the round function and the key scheduling of LBlock, we reduce the subkey guess space for the 15-round attack from 76 bits to 52 bits, lowering the time complexity from \(O(2^{38})\) to \(O(2^{26})\) by a factor of \(2^{12}\).
arXiv:2610.27506 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2610.27506v1 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.27506 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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