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This article examines QBism, a specific interpretation of quantum mechanics, arguing that it treats spacetime as personalistic to resolve tensions between locality and nonlocality without violating Bell's inequalities. By rejecting the absoluteness of observed events across distinct observers, this framework offers a unique perspective on reconciling quantum theory with gravity through subjective rather than objective spacetime structures. The work advances foundational debates in quantum foundations by clarifying how QBism maintains local realism despite standard violations of locality constraints.
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What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

QBism on Locality and Nonlocality

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.05368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recently Pienaar (2026), building on work of Cavalcanti (2021), has shown that QBism cannot always assume distinct observers' quantum-measurement outcomes---say, of Wigner and his friend---are embedded in a single spacetime. This follows from QBism's rejection of the `Absoluteness of Observed Events' assumption in the Bong et al. no-go theorem. Thus, QBism has no choice but to treat the notion of spacetime every bit as personalistic as it treats quantum states and quantum measurement outcomes. In a way, this is not a surprise to QBists, as they have taken the notion of `personalist spacetimes' to be the ansatz most compatible with their other views since at least 2009. But it does enjoin us to finally make crystal clear the sense in which QBism is a purely local interpretation of quantum mechanics despite this new theorem and despite quantum theory's age-old violation of Bell's inequalities. With the extra clarity we also hope to poise QBism for a distinctly new way to approach issues at the interface of quantum theory and gravity.

Abstract:Recently Pienaar (2026), building on work of Cavalcanti (2021), has shown that QBism cannot always assume distinct observers' quantum-measurement outcomes---say, of Wigner and his friend---are embedded in a single spacetime. This follows from QBism's rejection of the `Absoluteness of Observed Events' assumption in the Bong et al. no-go theorem. Thus, QBism has no choice but to treat the notion of spacetime every bit as personalistic as it treats quantum states and quantum measurement outcomes. In a way, this is not a surprise to QBists, as they have taken the notion of `personalist spacetimes' to be the ansatz most compatible with their other views since at least 2009. But it does enjoin us to finally make crystal clear the sense in which QBism is a purely local interpretation of quantum mechanics despite this new theorem and despite quantum theory's age-old violation of Bell's inequalities. With the extra clarity we also hope to poise QBism for a distinctly new way to approach issues at the interface of quantum theory and gravity.

arXiv:2608.05368 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2608.05368v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.05368 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 260 words

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