aiqbench analysis
ProtoArena introduces a rigorous black-box benchmark for testing LLM agents against real-world cross-component protocol vulnerabilities, addressing a critical gap in current security evaluation methods. The study demonstrates that while guided agents can successfully exploit specific inconsistencies across network domains, their performance degrades significantly under strict black-box constraints without source code access. This research advances the field by providing a dynamic environment to assess the robustness of AI-driven penetration testing tools against complex, multi-layered protocol interactions.
ProtoArena: Can AI Agents Discover and Exploit Real-World Cross-Component Protocol Vulnerabilities?
arXiv:2610.17837v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for vulnerability analysis, yet existing benchmarks provide limited coverage of exploitation that depends on interactions among network protocol components. Such vulnerabilities arise from inconsistencies in message interpretation, timing, state, or trust assumptions across participants. We introduce ProtoArena, a black-box, multi-component, dynamic benchmark with 80 cross-component vulnerability-exploitation environments spanning 11 protocol and application domains and 7 attack categories. Tasks are primarily informed by published protocol-attack mechanisms. Agents interact with running systems through scoped interfaces to achieve security-effect objectives without target source code. Three information levels assess guided reproduction, exploitation with mechanism and topology context, and effect-directed black-box exploration. A hybrid verifier combines rule-based checks with LLM review of independently collected traffic and logs. We evaluate five LLMs. Claude Opus 4.8 achieves the highest observed success rates: 48.8% under L1 guidance and 12.5% under effect-directed black-box L3. In a separate DNSBomb optimization experiment, it achieves a peak downstream-response to average query-input byte-rate ratio exceeding 171,000 times. The results show that agents can achieve verifiable exploitation effects in some cross-component environments, but success with limited black-box information remains low and varies across domains and attack categories. All experiments use controlled, explicitly authorized targets; they do not test production systems or disclose previously unknown vulnerabilities.
Title:ProtoArena: Can AI Agents Discover and Exploit Real-World Cross-Component Protocol Vulnerabilities?
Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for vulnerability analysis, yet existing benchmarks provide limited coverage of exploitation that depends on interactions among network protocol components. Such vulnerabilities arise from inconsistencies in message interpretation, timing, state, or trust assumptions across participants. We introduce ProtoArena, a black-box, multi-component, dynamic benchmark with 80 cross-component vulnerability-exploitation environments spanning 11 protocol and application domains and 7 attack categories. Tasks are primarily informed by published protocol-attack mechanisms. Agents interact with running systems through scoped interfaces to achieve security-effect objectives without target source code. Three information levels assess guided reproduction, exploitation with mechanism and topology context, and effect-directed black-box exploration. A hybrid verifier combines rule-based checks with LLM review of independently collected traffic and logs. We evaluate five LLMs. Claude Opus 4.8 achieves the highest observed success rates: 48.8% under L1 guidance and 12.5% under effect-directed black-box L3. In a separate DNSBomb optimization experiment, it achieves a peak downstream-response to average query-input byte-rate ratio exceeding 171,000 times. The results show that agents can achieve verifiable exploitation effects in some cross-component environments, but success with limited black-box information remains low and varies across domains and attack categories. All experiments use controlled, explicitly authorized targets; they do not test production systems or disclose previously unknown vulnerabilities.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.17837 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2610.17837v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.17837 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 318 words
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