aiqbench analysis
This research introduces Precision-Varying Prediction (PVP), a novel technique that enhances the adversarial robustness of automatic speech recognition models by dynamically sampling numerical precision during inference. By combining this method with uncertainty-based defenses, the approach effectively detects and mitigates attacks without requiring perceptible noise from adversaries. The study demonstrates significant improvements in security boundaries across various ASR architectures, languages, and attack vectors, offering a practical pathway to secure agentic systems.
Precision-Varying Prediction (PVP): Robustifying ASR systems against adversarial attacks
arXiv:2603.22590v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: With the increasing deployment of automated and agentic systems, ensuring the adversarial robustness of automatic speech recognition (ASR) models has become highly relevant. We observe that changing the precision of an ASR model during inference reduces the likelihood of adversarial attacks to succeed. We take advantage of this fact to make models more robust simply by randomly sampling the precision during prediction. Moreover, this insight can be turned into an adversarial example detection strategy by implementing a simple Gaussian classifier that thresholds the differences between outputs of models run with different precision. To further enhance security boundaries, we combine the approach with an existing uncertainty-based defense mechanism, which forces adaptive adversaries to introduce highly perceptible noise to bypass detection. An experimental analysis across various ASR models, languages, and attack types demonstrates a significant increase in adversarial robustness, competitive detection capabilities, and resistance to adaptive threats.
Abstract:With the increasing deployment of automated and agentic systems, ensuring the adversarial robustness of automatic speech recognition (ASR) models has become highly relevant. We observe that changing the precision of an ASR model during inference reduces the likelihood of adversarial attacks to succeed. We take advantage of this fact to make models more robust simply by randomly sampling the precision during prediction. Moreover, this insight can be turned into an adversarial example detection strategy by implementing a simple Gaussian classifier that thresholds the differences between outputs of models run with different precision. To further enhance security boundaries, we combine the approach with an existing uncertainty-based defense mechanism, which forces adaptive adversaries to introduce highly perceptible noise to bypass detection. An experimental analysis across various ASR models, languages, and attack types demonstrates a significant increase in adversarial robustness, competitive detection capabilities, and resistance to adaptive threats.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Audio and Speech Processing (eess.AS)
arXiv:2603.22590 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2603.22590v2 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.22590 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 246 words
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