aiqbench analysis
This research proposes PQ-Vault, a custody system designed to secure Ethereum assets against future quantum attacks by enforcing the use of quantum-safe primitives within existing blockchain rules. The authors provide formal proofs demonstrating that current sidechains and bridges cannot protect exposed public keys without such modifications, while also addressing specific vulnerabilities in proof-of-stake certificate compression and validator slot steering.
PQ-Vault: Provably Quantum-Safe Asset Custody for Unmodified Ethereum
arXiv:2610.29230v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A quantum computer could recover the key of any Ethereum account whose public key appears on chain. We prove that no sidechain or bridge that leaves Ethereum's rules unchanged can protect such accounts: their funds must move into a contract whose release condition relies only on quantum-safe primitives. We design \emph{PQ-Vault}, a custody system for unmodified Ethereum combining this vault, a quantum-safe proof-of-stake sidechain whose checkpoints carry compact certificates, and an optimistic dispute protocol. We give the first security proof of compact certificates against quantum attackers and a matching attack: with classically chosen parameters, the guarantee falls from 128 to about 60 bits, and a simple rule restores it. We show that a common seed-update rule in hash-chain proof of stake lets an attacker steer chosen slots and profit from splitting its stake, and give an election whose steering gain and inclusion delay are provably bounded against quantum attackers. Since compressing certificates with a pairing-based SNARK breaks quantum security, we use fraud proofs that need a single signature check. For 65,536 validators, a certificate is 0.8 MB, 260 times smaller than all signatures, and verifies in about 20 ms; the vault accepts a checkpoint for about 420,000 gas.
Abstract:A quantum computer could recover the key of any Ethereum account whose public key appears on chain. We prove that no sidechain or bridge that leaves Ethereum's rules unchanged can protect such accounts: their funds must move into a contract whose release condition relies only on quantum-safe primitives. We design \emph{PQ-Vault}, a custody system for unmodified Ethereum combining this vault, a quantum-safe proof-of-stake sidechain whose checkpoints carry compact certificates, and an optimistic dispute protocol. We give the first security proof of compact certificates against quantum attackers and a matching attack: with classically chosen parameters, the guarantee falls from 128 to about 60 bits, and a simple rule restores it. We show that a common seed-update rule in hash-chain proof of stake lets an attacker steer chosen slots and profit from splitting its stake, and give an election whose steering gain and inclusion delay are provably bounded against quantum attackers. Since compressing certificates with a pairing-based SNARK breaks quantum security, we use fraud proofs that need a single signature check. For 65,536 validators, a certificate is 0.8 MB, 260 times smaller than all signatures, and verifies in about 20 ms; the vault accepts a checkpoint for about 420,000 gas.
Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Information Theory (cs.IT)
arXiv:2610.29230 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:2610.29230v1 [quant-ph] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.29230 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 305 words