aiqbench analysis
The paper studies whether a runtime policy verifier's allow/block decisions can be reused as training signal, so agents learn to comply rather than just being blocked. On AgentDojo under prompt injection, preference training on verifier-labeled trajectories cut violations and successful attacks substantially, though the authors report utility loss on the travel suite and results from a single model family. Readers should note that the method needs a deterministic gate compiled from a written policy and that the authors identify conditions where the verdict is informative.
Policy-Verified Self-Training: Learning Agent Compliance from Verifiable Policy Rewards
arXiv:2610.19372v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Runtime policy verifiers can prevent agents from executing disallowed actions, but their decisions are typically used only for enforcement and discarded afterward. We ask whether these decisions can instead become verifiable policy rewards for training the agents they guard. We introduce Policy-Verified Self-Training (PVST), a post-training paradigm in which an agent generates its own interaction trajectories and an executable policy verifier, here a deterministic gate compiled from a written policy, evaluates whether each action complies. Compliant trajectories are reinforced, and violations become negatives for preference optimization; beyond the gate and the benchmark's task-success signal, PVST needs no stronger teacher model, no human preference labels and no attack-specific supervision, although rollouts are collected in the benchmark's attacked environment. On held-out AgentDojo tasks under prompt injection, policy-verified preference training of Qwen3-8B reduces violating trajectories from 37.2% to 10.3 $\pm$ 0.9% (three seeds) and successful attacks from 12.4% to 0.5% at equal or higher pooled task utility, although utility falls on travel, compared with 22.0% when negatives are selected by an attack oracle and 31.9 $\pm$ 0.9% with negatives that contain no violation. The learned behavior holds under an attack template never used in training (37.7% to 11.0%) and on a suite excluded from training (34.8% to 16.7%), and the retained verifier's intervention rate falls from 39.2% to 8.8% (seed 0). Our analysis identifies two conditions under which the verdict is most informative: success must not already imply compliance, and guarded actions must appear in both permitted and forbidden contexts.
Abstract:Runtime policy verifiers can prevent agents from executing disallowed actions, but their decisions are typically used only for enforcement and discarded afterward. We ask whether these decisions can instead become verifiable policy rewards for training the agents they guard. We introduce Policy-Verified Self-Training (PVST), a post-training paradigm in which an agent generates its own interaction trajectories and an executable policy verifier, here a deterministic gate compiled from a written policy, evaluates whether each action complies. Compliant trajectories are reinforced, and violations become negatives for preference optimization; beyond the gate and the benchmark's task-success signal, PVST needs no stronger teacher model, no human preference labels and no attack-specific supervision, although rollouts are collected in the benchmark's attacked environment. On held-out AgentDojo tasks under prompt injection, policy-verified preference training of Qwen3-8B reduces violating trajectories from 37.2% to 10.3 $\pm$ 0.9% (three seeds) and successful attacks from 12.4% to 0.5% at equal or higher pooled task utility, although utility falls on travel, compared with 22.0% when negatives are selected by an attack oracle and 31.9 $\pm$ 0.9% with negatives that contain no violation. The learned behavior holds under an attack template never used in training (37.7% to 11.0%) and on a suite excluded from training (34.8% to 16.7%), and the retained verifier's intervention rate falls from 39.2% to 8.8% (seed 0). Our analysis identifies two conditions under which the verdict is most informative: success must not already imply compliance, and guarded actions must appear in both permitted and forbidden contexts.
16 pages, 3 figures, 13 tables. Companion paper: arXiv:2610.11030
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.19372 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2610.19372v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.19372 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 353 words
Related coverage
[AINews] OpenAI DevDay 2026: Dots, 6.1 Sol, Ultrafast, Decisions API, Agents API, Spaces, Marketplace, and 1.2 Billion ChatGPT WAU
Latent Space · Sep 30, 2026

Why I Left Google DeepMind
LessWrong · Jul 15, 2026

Article: Governing AI in the Cloud: A Practical Guide for Architects
InfoQ · Jun 15, 2026

Presentation: From AI Agent Demo to Production: Automated Testing and Evaluation
InfoQ · Sep 7, 2026