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This research exposes critical adversarial vulnerabilities in LLM-based multi-agent trading systems, demonstrating how low-barrier attacks on input data can propagate through specialized roles like Analysts and Risk Managers to cause financial loss. The study systematically evaluates signal preservation across various communication topologies, concluding that no current architecture is inherently robust against such poisoning attacks. These findings are essential for developers deploying agentic systems in live financial environments to prioritize defense-in-depth strategies over relying on architectural assumptions.
Sources coveringarXiv, LessWrong, InfoQ
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Poisoning Agentic Alpha: Adversarial Vulnerabilities Across Roles and Architectures in Multi-Agent Trading Systems

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2608.24069v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based multi-agent trading systems, in which specialized agents collaborate through structured communication to produce trading decisions, are moving rapidly from research prototypes to live deployments that control real assets. The same inter-agent communication that makes them effective also exposes them: a corrupted signal can propagate to the final decision and translate into realized financial loss. Unlike prior attacks that presume privileged access to system internals, we restrict the adversary to what is practically reachable---the source data and prompts agents consume---yielding a low-barrier, and thus democratized threat model instantiated as role-specific adversaries. We present the first systematic empirical study in the financial domain to characterize how an adversarial signal enters a multi-agent trading system and how far it survives toward the decision. Along the role axis, we decompose a widely-used trading pipeline into four functional roles---Analyst, Researcher, Trader, and Risk Manager---and pair each with an attack matched to its interface. Along the structural axis, we evaluate four communication topologies under data- and agent-level attacks, using the Adversarial Signal Preservation Score (APS) as a post-hoc lens on why some designs are more robust than others. We conduct experiments across five assets, two backbones, and two target directions. A central finding is that no architecture is inherently robust. These findings provide insights for the future design of safer and more robust agentic trading systems.

Abstract:LLM-based multi-agent trading systems, in which specialized agents collaborate through structured communication to produce trading decisions, are moving rapidly from research prototypes to live deployments that control real assets. The same inter-agent communication that makes them effective also exposes them: a corrupted signal can propagate to the final decision and translate into realized financial loss. Unlike prior attacks that presume privileged access to system internals, we restrict the adversary to what is practically reachable---the source data and prompts agents consume---yielding a low-barrier, and thus democratized threat model instantiated as role-specific adversaries. We present the first systematic empirical study in the financial domain to characterize how an adversarial signal enters a multi-agent trading system and how far it survives toward the decision. Along the role axis, we decompose a widely-used trading pipeline into four functional roles---Analyst, Researcher, Trader, and Risk Manager---and pair each with an attack matched to its interface. Along the structural axis, we evaluate four communication topologies under data- and agent-level attacks, using the Adversarial Signal Preservation Score (APS) as a post-hoc lens on why some designs are more robust than others. We conduct experiments across five assets, two backbones, and two target directions. A central finding is that no architecture is inherently robust. These findings provide insights for the future design of safer and more robust agentic trading systems.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science (cs.CE)

arXiv:2608.24069 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2608.24069v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.24069 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 321 words

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