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This podcast focuses on the strategic imperative of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and cryptoagility, addressing the critical timing gap between current cryptographic vulnerabilities and the anticipated arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum computers. The discussion highlights practical mitigation strategies, such as using quantum proxies to shield traffic during infrastructure upgrades, while positioning quantum security risks as a secondary but urgent priority behind AI for CISOs.
Source coveringQuantum Computing Report
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Podcast with Joel Van Dyk, CTO/CISO and Co-Founder of Done. Quantum Security Limited

Quantum Computing Report23 min read

Podcast with Joel Van Dyk, a physicist turned Wall Street cybersecurity veteran, about the quantum threat to cryptography and what organizations should be doing right now to prepare. The post Podcast with Joel Van Dyk, CTO/CISO and Co-Founder of Done. Quantum Security Limited appeared first on Quantum Computing Report.

Yuval Boger speaks with Joel Van Dyk, a physicist turned Wall Street cybersecurity veteran, about the quantum threat to cryptography and what organizations should be doing right now to prepare. Joel shared why he ranks quantum as one of the top risks for CISOs, explained the concept of cryptoagility — the need for continuous readiness to swap algorithms as quantum computers evolve — and described the tools he’s building, including a quantum proxy called PQC Done that acts as a shield while firms undertake the years-long process of upgrading their cryptographic infrastructure. They also discussed how boards are becoming aware of the quantum risk, why the security and opportunity sides of quantum should work hand in hand, and where QKD fits into the broader post-quantum landscape. Van Dyk sees a timing gap. He cites estimates that large banks may need about ten years to replace their cryptographic plumbing, while he considers a cryptographically relevant quantum computer most likely in four or five years. His proxy, PQC Done, is meant to shift traffic to quantum-safe algorithms like a firewall while that deeper upgrade continues. He argues that a one-time migration is the wrong mental model. Because he expects today’s algorithms to…

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