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This research advances online learning algorithms for first-price auctions by integrating hard budget constraints with nonstationary private-value distributions. The authors propose a modular policy that decomposes performance gaps into execution error and plan-mismatch terms, offering rigorous guarantees when competing bid distributions shift over time. This work is significant for advertisers and platforms seeking to optimize bidding strategies under uncertainty without violating strict campaign budgets.
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Plan-Driven Adaptive Bidding for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Nonstationarity

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2505.02796v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is $O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)$, where $\mathcal W_T$ measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided $O(\sqrt{T})$ fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by $(b/2a)PlanError$. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through $PlanError$. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.

Abstract:We study budget pacing in repeated first-price auctions when an advertiser's private-value distributions change over time and the stationary competing-bid distribution is unknown. We ask how a feasible expenditure plan should enter online bid shading, learning, and hard budget control. We establish a plan-to-performance decomposition for a plan-driven projected-dual policy. The policy uses any feasible expenditure plan as a soft target, learns an unknown stationary competing-bid CDF from thresholds revealed after each auction, and enforces the campaign budget on every sample path. Against a distribution-informed expected-budget fluid benchmark, the uniform-plan reward gap is $O(\sqrt T)+O(\mathcal W_T)$, where $\mathcal W_T$ measures heterogeneity in private-value distributions. With a supplied feasible plan, the global gap decomposes into a one-sided $O(\sqrt{T})$ fixed-plan execution term and a plan-mismatch term bounded by $(b/2a)PlanError$. The same analysis provides guarantees for strict and relaxed period-cap comparators, exact recovery of the global benchmark under a specific allowance vector, and separate lower bounds establishing the necessity of the temporal-heterogeneity and Plan Error terms. An upstream planner can translate forecasts or managerial priorities into a feasible spending trajectory, while the online controller adapts bids using realized thresholds and expenditures. The guarantee is modular: it evaluates the final normalized or projected plan through $PlanError$. A specific forecasting model can be linked to the guarantee by establishing how its primitive estimation errors propagate to this plan-quality metric.

Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2505.02796 [cs.GT]

(or arXiv:2505.02796v3 [cs.GT] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2505.02796 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 322 words

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