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This research introduces physics-constrained digital twins to detect stealthy false data injection attacks in urban pedestrian flow systems, leveraging flow conservation laws rather than simple spatial locality for robustness. By employing adaptive conformal calibration, the method achieves significant attack margins even when a substantial portion of the sensor fleet is compromised, demonstrating that physical constraints provide superior integrity guarantees over standard graph-based approaches.
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Physics-Constrained Digital Twins for Sensor Integrity in Urban Pedestrian Flow: Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection with Conformal Guarantees

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.17635v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: City pedestrian counting systems now feed economic indicators, planning decisions and safety operations, yet the twins built on top of them treat the incoming stream as ground truth. We study what happens when it is not. We formalise stealthy false data injection for city-scale pedestrian sensing, where the map from latent flow to observation is far more rank deficient than in the power and water networks for which stealth has been characterised. Our twin estimates directed flows on the pedestrian street graph, assimilates counts through a learned graph-localised gain, and is trained against a flow conservation residual that couples metered and unmetered segments. Detection combines the innovation with that residual, and the alarm threshold is set by adaptive conformal calibration rather than by hand. To measure what the physics buys, we define the attack margin, the relative reduction in worst-case corruption of the estimated flow field, achieved against a white-box adversary that optimises directly through the twin. On six years of Melbourne data the margin reaches 0.54 against a single compromised device and falls to 0.19 when a third of the fleet is compromised, on a network where only 1.18 per cent of walkable segments are metered. Replacing the street graph by a distance graph collapses it to 0.09, which shows that the gain comes from the conservation law rather than from locality.

Abstract:City pedestrian counting systems now feed economic indicators, planning decisions and safety operations, yet the twins built on top of them treat the incoming stream as ground truth. We study what happens when it is not. We formalise stealthy false data injection for city-scale pedestrian sensing, where the map from latent flow to observation is far more rank deficient than in the power and water networks for which stealth has been characterised. Our twin estimates directed flows on the pedestrian street graph, assimilates counts through a learned graph-localised gain, and is trained against a flow conservation residual that couples metered and unmetered segments. Detection combines the innovation with that residual, and the alarm threshold is set by adaptive conformal calibration rather than by hand. To measure what the physics buys, we define the attack margin, the relative reduction in worst-case corruption of the estimated flow field, achieved against a white-box adversary that optimises directly through the twin. On six years of Melbourne data the margin reaches 0.54 against a single compromised device and falls to 0.19 when a third of the fleet is compromised, on a network where only 1.18 per cent of walkable segments are metered. Replacing the street graph by a distance graph collapses it to 0.09, which shows that the gain comes from the conservation law rather than from locality.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2609.17635 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.17635v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.17635 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 321 words

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