Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Safety

aiqbench analysis

This research dissects the representational geometry of aligned LLMs, revealing that over-refusal stems from task-dependent subspaces distinct from global harmful-refusal vectors. The findings demonstrate that simple ablation of a single refusal direction is insufficient because it disrupts the broader mechanism while failing to address these specific geometric nuances. Consequently, effective mitigation strategies must rely on task-specific geometric interventions rather than universal vector adjustments.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Over-Refusal and Representation Subspaces: A Mechanistic Analysis of Task-Conditioned Refusal in Aligned LLMs

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2603.27518v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Aligned language models that are trained to refuse harmful requests also exhibit over-refusal: they decline safe instructions that seemingly resemble harmful instructions. A natural approach is to ablate the global refusal direction, steering the hidden-state vectors away or towards the harmful-refusal examples, but this corrects over-refusal only incidentally while disrupting the broader refusal mechanism. In this work, we analyse the representational geometry of both refusal types to understand why this happens. We show that harmful-refusal directions are task-agnostic and can be captured by a single global vector, whereas over-refusal directions are task-dependent: they reside within the benign task-representation clusters, vary across tasks, and span a higher-dimensional subspace. Linear probing suggests that the two refusal types are representationally distinct from the early transformer layers. These findings provide a mechanistic explanation of why global direction ablation alone cannot address over-refusal, and establish that task-specific geometric interventions are necessary.

Abstract:Aligned language models that are trained to refuse harmful requests also exhibit over-refusal: they decline safe instructions that seemingly resemble harmful instructions. A natural approach is to ablate the global refusal direction, steering the hidden-state vectors away or towards the harmful-refusal examples, but this corrects over-refusal only incidentally while disrupting the broader refusal mechanism. In this work, we analyse the representational geometry of both refusal types to understand why this happens. We show that harmful-refusal directions are task-agnostic and can be captured by a single global vector, whereas over-refusal directions are task-dependent: they reside within the benign task-representation clusters, vary across tasks, and span a higher-dimensional subspace. Linear probing suggests that the two refusal types are representationally distinct from the early transformer layers. These findings provide a mechanistic explanation of why global direction ablation alone cannot address over-refusal, and establish that task-specific geometric interventions are necessary.

Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2603.27518 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2603.27518v4 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.27518 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 239 words

Related coverage