Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints

Abstract:We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agent or to charity, which holds all unallocated goods, while fairness is evaluated only against budget-feasible subsets of every recipient's bundle. We first show that, without additional structure, no deterministic online algorithm can guarantee any fixed approximation to feasible envy-freeness, even in highly symmetric instances. We then identify bounded density spread as a structural condition that restores meaningful guarantees, obtaining approximation algorithms for arbitrary item sizes and showing that, under common valuations and sufficiently small goods, these guarantees can be strengthened to an optimal deterministic frontier. We further study resource augmentation, where the online algorithm is allowed slightly larger budgets than the fairness benchmark, and characterize the resulting improvement in the achievable guarantees. Finally, we develop a learning-augmented framework based on predicting joint value-size types, proving consistency under perfect predictions, robustness to prediction error, and showing that separate predictions of value and size marginals are insufficient to recover strong fairness guarantees.

Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)

arXiv:2607.23310 [cs.GT]

(or arXiv:2607.23310v1 [cs.GT] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.23310 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)