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This research exposes a critical vulnerability in current machine unlearning methods, demonstrating that sensitive data can often be recovered using simple decoding techniques even after purported removal. By introducing a white-box auditing framework, the study provides empirical evidence that existing approaches frequently fail to genuinely erase private information from large language models. These findings are essential for establishing robust privacy guarantees and validating the reliability of unlearning protocols in deployed AI systems.
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On the Recoverability of Private Information Unlearning in Large Language Models

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.29943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can memorize sensitive information, raising serious privacy concerns. Machine unlearning offers a potential solution to remove such information, but it remains unclear whether existing methods truly erase it or merely hide it within the model. A key challenge is quantifying the persistence of sensitive data under a unified evaluation framework. To address this, we construct a synthetic dataset containing fake private information and propose a white-box auditing framework to systematically assess whether claimed-forgotten information is genuinely removed. Using this framework, we evaluate five existing unlearning methods and find that a simple "inverse greedy" decoding -- selecting the least likely token at each step -- can recover supposedly forgotten private information. Our results reveal that current unlearning approaches often fail to fully eliminate sensitive information, highlighting the need for more reliable methods to ensure privacy in deployed LLMs.

Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) can memorize sensitive information, raising serious privacy concerns. Machine unlearning offers a potential solution to remove such information, but it remains unclear whether existing methods truly erase it or merely hide it within the model. A key challenge is quantifying the persistence of sensitive data under a unified evaluation framework. To address this, we construct a synthetic dataset containing fake private information and propose a white-box auditing framework to systematically assess whether claimed-forgotten information is genuinely removed. Using this framework, we evaluate five existing unlearning methods and find that a simple "inverse greedy" decoding -- selecting the least likely token at each step -- can recover supposedly forgotten private information. Our results reveal that current unlearning approaches often fail to fully eliminate sensitive information, highlighting the need for more reliable methods to ensure privacy in deployed LLMs.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2608.29943 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2608.29943v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.29943 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 239 words

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