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This research exposes a critical trade-off in large reasoning models where efficiency optimizations like quantization and pruning often degrade genuine safety alignment by impairing the model's reasoning capabilities, causing it to fail malicious requests rather than adhering to ethical guidelines. The study clarifies that apparent robustness gains are frequently superficial artifacts of reduced intelligence, urging developers to distinguish between true alignment and capability-induced failure when deploying cost-effective models.
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On the Efficiency-Safety Dilemma in Large Reasoning Models

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.23587v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) incur high inference costs, often mitigated by efficiency techniques like quantization and pruning. However, the impact of these techniques on model adversarial robustness remains largely unexplored. This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of the interplay between efficiency, jailbreak vulnerability, and reasoning in LRMs. We find that while efficiency methods seemingly reduce the success rate of jailbreak attacks, this improvement is often superficial. It largely arises from degraded reasoning capabilities leading to "attempted but failed" malicious responses, rather than an increase in genuine alignment. Mechanistic analysis of representational drift confirms this, revealing a strict coupling between reasoning capability loss and the model's inability to maintain malicious semantic trajectories. Additionally, we identify quantization with pruning as the optimal strategy to balance efficiency and robustness. These findings clarify the distinction between true safety alignment and capability-induced failure, providing an empirical foundation for LRM deployment.

Abstract:Large reasoning models (LRMs) incur high inference costs, often mitigated by efficiency techniques like quantization and pruning. However, the impact of these techniques on model adversarial robustness remains largely unexplored. This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of the interplay between efficiency, jailbreak vulnerability, and reasoning in LRMs. We find that while efficiency methods seemingly reduce the success rate of jailbreak attacks, this improvement is often superficial. It largely arises from degraded reasoning capabilities leading to "attempted but failed" malicious responses, rather than an increase in genuine alignment. Mechanistic analysis of representational drift confirms this, revealing a strict coupling between reasoning capability loss and the model's inability to maintain malicious semantic trajectories. Additionally, we identify quantization with pruning as the optimal strategy to balance efficiency and robustness. These findings clarify the distinction between true safety alignment and capability-induced failure, providing an empirical foundation for LRM deployment.

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2609.23587 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2609.23587v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.23587 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 244 words

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