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This research addresses a critical security gap by analyzing how Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) adversarial attacks compromise acoustic-based drone localization systems, which are increasingly used as alternatives to vision-dependent navigation. The study provides a comprehensive evaluation of these threats and introduces an algorithm for perturbation recovery to enhance the resilience of autonomous aerial vehicles against navigational spoofing.
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On Adversarial Attacks In Acoustic Drone Localization

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2502.20325v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Multi-rotor aerial autonomous vehicles (MAVs, more widely known as "drones") have been generating increased interest in recent years due to their growing applicability in a vast and diverse range of fields (e.g., agriculture, commercial delivery, search and rescue). The sensitivity of visual-based methods to lighting conditions and occlusions had prompted growing study of navigation reliant on other modalities, such as acoustic sensing. A major concern in using drones in scale for tasks in non-controlled environments is the potential threat of adversarial attacks over their navigational systems, exposing users to mission-critical failures, security breaches, and compromised safety outcomes that can endanger operators and bystanders. While previous work shows impressive progress in acoustic-based drone localization, prior research in adversarial attacks over drone navigation only addresses visual sensing-based systems. In this work, we aim to compensate for this gap by supplying a comprehensive analysis of the effect of PGD adversarial attacks over acoustic drone localization. We furthermore develop an algorithm for adversarial perturbation recovery, capable of markedly diminishing the affect of such attacks in our setting.

Abstract:Multi-rotor aerial autonomous vehicles (MAVs, more widely known as "drones") have been generating increased interest in recent years due to their growing applicability in a vast and diverse range of fields (e.g., agriculture, commercial delivery, search and rescue). The sensitivity of visual-based methods to lighting conditions and occlusions had prompted growing study of navigation reliant on other modalities, such as acoustic sensing. A major concern in using drones in scale for tasks in non-controlled environments is the potential threat of adversarial attacks over their navigational systems, exposing users to mission-critical failures, security breaches, and compromised safety outcomes that can endanger operators and bystanders. While previous work shows impressive progress in acoustic-based drone localization, prior research in adversarial attacks over drone navigation only addresses visual sensing-based systems. In this work, we aim to compensate for this gap by supplying a comprehensive analysis of the effect of PGD adversarial attacks over acoustic drone localization. We furthermore develop an algorithm for adversarial perturbation recovery, capable of markedly diminishing the affect of such attacks in our setting.

Sound (cs.SD); Robotics (cs.RO); Audio and Speech Processing (eess.AS)

arXiv:2502.20325 [cs.SD]

(or arXiv:2502.20325v3 [cs.SD] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2502.20325 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 271 words

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