aiqbench analysis
This research investigates whether pricing algorithms that ignore competitor data ("oblivious" learning) inadvertently facilitate collusion in competitive markets, challenging classical assumptions about model misspecification. The study demonstrates that while all-informed markets converge to efficient competitive outcomes, mixed environments where some agents ignore competitors create pseudo-equilibria that can sustain higher prices. Ultimately, the findings suggest that oblivious modeling does not robustly lead to collusive patterns provided exploration strategies are sufficiently aggressive.
Oblivious Learning and Collusive Pricing
arXiv:2606.05363v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical arguments suggest that ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency, yet findings from algorithmic collusion suggest that ignoring competitor prices may, surprisingly, facilitate collusive outcomes and improve profits. We study this problem in a competitive market with unknown noisy demand, in which sellers repeatedly set prices, either incorporating competitor prices in learning their demand models (informed), or ignoring them (oblivious). We show that, relative to a monopolist, an oblivious seller in a competitive market must conduct more aggressive price exploration to compensate for the loss of dynamic competitor information. When all sellers are oblivious, prices converge to the competitive outcome under persistent exploration, while a continuum of pseudo-equilibria arises when exploration is "insufficient." In markets with a mix of oblivious and informed sellers, the informed strictly out-earn the oblivious. In game-theoretic terms, the unique Nash equilibrium is the all-informed market, in which prices converge to the competitive outcome efficiently, and oblivious modeling does not robustly lead to collusive patterns.
Abstract:On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical arguments suggest that ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency, yet findings from algorithmic collusion suggest that ignoring competitor prices may, surprisingly, facilitate collusive outcomes and improve profits. We study this problem in a competitive market with unknown noisy demand, in which sellers repeatedly set prices, either incorporating competitor prices in learning their demand models (informed), or ignoring them (oblivious). We show that, relative to a monopolist, an oblivious seller in a competitive market must conduct more aggressive price exploration to compensate for the loss of dynamic competitor information. When all sellers are oblivious, prices converge to the competitive outcome under persistent exploration, while a continuum of pseudo-equilibria arises when exploration is "insufficient." In markets with a mix of oblivious and informed sellers, the informed strictly out-earn the oblivious. In game-theoretic terms, the unique Nash equilibrium is the all-informed market, in which prices converge to the competitive outcome efficiently, and oblivious modeling does not robustly lead to collusive patterns.
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); Optimization and Control (math.OC)
arXiv:2606.05363 [cs.GT]
(or arXiv:2606.05363v3 [cs.GT] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.05363 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 282 words
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