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NeuronGuard addresses the brittleness of LLM safety by redistributing safety signals across neurons rather than relying on sparse subsets, offering robustness against both prompt-based jailbreaks and direct neuron-level pruning. The method maintains task utility through randomized gradient projection while providing formal guarantees that strictly reduce attack success rates even against adaptive adversaries.
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NeuronGuard: Robust LLM Safety Alignment via Ablation-Aware Safety Signal Redistribution

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.23959v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) remains brittle against a growing spectrum of attacks. Jailbreak attacks bypass safety mechanisms through crafted prompts, while neuron-level attacks directly prune safety-critical neurons post-deployment. Both exploit a common weakness: safety-relevant information concentrates in a sparse neuron subset. We present NeuronGuard, a fine-tuning-stage defense that simultaneously hardens LLMs against both attack classes by redistributing safety signals across a broader set of neurons. NeuronGuard dynamically identifies safety-critical neurons via periodically refreshed per-layer linear classifiers, forces refusal behavior under deliberate neuron ablation, and applies KL-divergence regularization for distributional consistency. A randomized gradient projection strategy preserves downstream task utility by resolving conflicts between the defense and task objectives. We provide a formal guarantee that NeuronGuard strictly reduces the attack success rate (ASR) upper bound, and experiments across three LLMs, six state-of-the-art attack strategies, and multimodal settings confirm near-zero ASR while maintaining task accuracy, including against white-box adaptive adversaries.

Abstract:Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) remains brittle against a growing spectrum of attacks. Jailbreak attacks bypass safety mechanisms through crafted prompts, while neuron-level attacks directly prune safety-critical neurons post-deployment. Both exploit a common weakness: safety-relevant information concentrates in a sparse neuron subset. We present NeuronGuard, a fine-tuning-stage defense that simultaneously hardens LLMs against both attack classes by redistributing safety signals across a broader set of neurons. NeuronGuard dynamically identifies safety-critical neurons via periodically refreshed per-layer linear classifiers, forces refusal behavior under deliberate neuron ablation, and applies KL-divergence regularization for distributional consistency. A randomized gradient projection strategy preserves downstream task utility by resolving conflicts between the defense and task objectives. We provide a formal guarantee that NeuronGuard strictly reduces the attack success rate (ASR) upper bound, and experiments across three LLMs, six state-of-the-art attack strategies, and multimodal settings confirm near-zero ASR while maintaining task accuracy, including against white-box adaptive adversaries.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Information Retrieval (cs.IR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2608.23959 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2608.23959v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.23959 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 255 words

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