Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Research

aiqbench analysis

NanoZK introduces a layerwise zero-knowledge proof framework that enables verifiable LLM inference while keeping model weights and activations hidden from auditors. By decomposing transformer layers into independently provable sub-circuits linked by commitment chains, the system achieves constant-size proofs comparable to prior monolithic approaches but with significantly better parallelization potential. This architecture addresses critical trust issues in cloud-based AI services without compromising on accuracy or requiring full model disclosure during verification.
Source coveringarXiv
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

NanoZK: Privacy-Preserving Verifiable Inference for Large Language Models via Layerwise Zero-Knowledge Proofs

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2603.18046v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We present NanoZK, a zero-knowledge proof system for verifiable LLM inference: clients and third-party auditors check that a provider executed the advertised model on a committed input without learning weights or activations. NanoZK introduces a layerwise proof framework that decomposes transformer inference into independently provable layers linked by a SHA-256 commitment chain, yielding constant-size sub-circuit proofs (3.5-3.7 KB; about 83 KB total at L=12), comparable in total size to and substantially more parallelizable than prior ZKML's monolithic 101-126 KB proofs. We prove compositional soundness and zero-knowledge under standard assumptions, design 16-bit lookup-table approximations for softmax, GELU, and normalization with measured perplexity degradation below 1e-4 across six model/dataset combinations, and add a Fisher-information-guided audit-budget triage as an efficiency tool (full soundness still requires verifying every layer). On CPU the MLP sub-circuit proves in about 6.3 s prove-only (about 43 s setup plus prove) with about 22 ms verification at any width; attention prove-only time scales from 0.9 s (d=16) to 184 s (d=256); full-block end-to-end proofs are measured to d=128, with a projected GPU time of about 68 s per block at d=768 from measured O(d^2) MSM scaling and a conservative 15-30x GPU-MSM speedup range based on Icicle's published 30x result for n >= 2^20 and extrapolated to the smaller-n regime. Privacy scope: NanoZK hides weights and activations from verifiers and auditors but does not hide the prompt from the prover; this is complementary to HE/MPC.

Abstract:We present NanoZK, a zero-knowledge proof system for verifiable LLM inference: clients and third-party auditors check that a provider executed the advertised model on a committed input without learning weights or activations. NanoZK introduces a layerwise proof framework that decomposes transformer inference into independently provable layers linked by a SHA-256 commitment chain, yielding constant-size sub-circuit proofs (3.5-3.7 KB; about 83 KB total at L=12), comparable in total size to and substantially more parallelizable than prior ZKML's monolithic 101-126 KB proofs. We prove compositional soundness and zero-knowledge under standard assumptions, design 16-bit lookup-table approximations for softmax, GELU, and normalization with measured perplexity degradation below 1e-4 across six model/dataset combinations, and add a Fisher-information-guided audit-budget triage as an efficiency tool (full soundness still requires verifying every layer). On CPU the MLP sub-circuit proves in about 6.3 s prove-only (about 43 s setup plus prove) with about 22 ms verification at any width; attention prove-only time scales from 0.9 s (d=16) to 184 s (d=256); full-block end-to-end proofs are measured to d=128, with a projected GPU time of about 68 s per block at d=768 from measured O(d^2) MSM scaling and a conservative 15-30x GPU-MSM speedup range based on Icicle's published 30x result for n >= 2^20 and extrapolated to the smaller-n regime. Privacy scope: NanoZK hides weights and activations from verifiers and auditors but does not hide the prompt from the prover; this is complementary to HE/MPC.

Extended version. The first 12 pages correspond to the ICICS 2026 (Springer LNCS) camera-ready paper. This version supersedes the earlier ICLR 2026 VeriFAI Workshop preprint and adds full security proofs, Halo2 circuit details, lookup-table derivations, extended experiments, verifier-cost analysis, GPU scaling, reproducibility instructions, and appendices omitted from the proceedings

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2603.18046 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2603.18046v2 [cs.LG] for this version)

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 302 words

Related coverage