aiqbench analysis
MOLOT introduces a static malicious-code detection framework that models source code as behavior sequences derived from call graphs, offering explainable insights without relying on dynamic execution traces or package metadata. Evaluated across Python and JavaScript ecosystems, the system demonstrates that static behavior-sequence modeling can achieve high accuracy and low false-positive rates suitable for real-world DevSecOps pipelines. The release of the Open Malicious-Code Bench provides a standardized benchmark for reproducibly assessing malicious-package detection methods in the community.
MOLOT System Card: Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer
arXiv:2606.07792v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.
Abstract:MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
K.6.5; D.4.6; I.2.6; I.5.2
arXiv:2606.07792 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.07792v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.07792 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 235 words
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