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This research addresses critical security vulnerabilities in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems by proposing KFS-RAG, a defense mechanism that sanitizes retrieved context to prevent prompt injection attacks from leaking sensitive database contents. By substituting raw text with keyword-grounded facts generated by an auxiliary model, the approach maintains response accuracy while significantly reducing information leakage risks. This work offers a practical pathway for deploying more secure and trustworthy LLM applications that rely on external knowledge sources.
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Mitigating Database Leakage in RAG Systems with Keyword-Grounded Fact Substitution

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.21656v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for combining large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge sources. However, RAG systems remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which may mislead the retriever or generator to expose sensitive database contents. To address this issue, we propose KFS-RAG, a defense that mitigates information leakage by reformulating the retrieved context. Specifically, our method first identifies a small set of influential keywords from the retrieved context via an attention rollout plus a causal perturbation mechanism. These keywords are then used to guide an auxiliary LLM to generate a compact set of keyword-grounded facts from the retrieved passages. Finally, the original context is substituted with these curated facts, ensuring that the generator operates on sanitized evidence rather than the raw retrieved text. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that KFS-RAG significantly reduces the risk of database leakage under injection attacks while maintaining response accuracy and relevance. This work highlights a practical pathway toward building secure and trustworthy RAG systems.

Abstract:Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for combining large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge sources. However, RAG systems remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which may mislead the retriever or generator to expose sensitive database contents. To address this issue, we propose KFS-RAG, a defense that mitigates information leakage by reformulating the retrieved context. Specifically, our method first identifies a small set of influential keywords from the retrieved context via an attention rollout plus a causal perturbation mechanism. These keywords are then used to guide an auxiliary LLM to generate a compact set of keyword-grounded facts from the retrieved passages. Finally, the original context is substituted with these curated facts, ensuring that the generator operates on sanitized evidence rather than the raw retrieved text. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that KFS-RAG significantly reduces the risk of database leakage under injection attacks while maintaining response accuracy and relevance. This work highlights a practical pathway toward building secure and trustworthy RAG systems.

Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2608.21656 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2608.21656v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.21656 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 257 words

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