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This research identifies the Filter-Generator Discrepancy (FGD) in text-to-image systems as a critical vulnerability where safety filters and generation models interpret prompts differently. The authors leverage this gap to develop a zero-query jailbreak framework that significantly improves attack success rates against black-box pipelines without needing direct access to the target system. This work highlights emerging adversarial risks for diffusion model deployments, emphasizing the need for robust alignment between filtering mechanisms and generative objectives.
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Mind the Gap: Zero-Query Jailbreaks via Filter-Generator Discrepancy in Text-to-Image Systems

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2608.00973v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Text-to-image (T2I) systems typically have prompt-level safety filters before the generator to block unsafe requests, yet such systems remain vulnerable to malicious jailbreak prompts. Transfer-based attacks construct adversarial prompts offline without querying the target, but they tend to overfit to a single surrogate. Moreover, they explore a large search space in which semantic or perceptual similarity alone cannot guarantee both filter evasion and preservation of the unsafe generation intent, wasting effort on low-potential candidates. We observe that the filter and the generator process the same prompt under different objectives and representations, and term this gap the Filter-Generator Discrepancy (FGD), which allows a perturbation to reduce a prompt's perceived risk to the filter while preserving the visual concept needed by the generator. Building on FGD, we propose a zero-query jailbreak framework that screens perturbations into a high-potential candidate set via observable discrepancy rules at the tokenization and semantic stages, and then performs a surrogate-ensemble evolutionary search that requires no access to the target. Experiments on six black-box pipelines and a commercial online service show that our method consistently outperforms representative baselines, raising the average attack success rate to 29.2\% (MHSC) and 33.3\% (Q16) across the six pipelines and improving over the strongest baseline by about 8 and 12 percentage points, respectively.

Abstract:Text-to-image (T2I) systems typically have prompt-level safety filters before the generator to block unsafe requests, yet such systems remain vulnerable to malicious jailbreak prompts. Transfer-based attacks construct adversarial prompts offline without querying the target, but they tend to overfit to a single surrogate. Moreover, they explore a large search space in which semantic or perceptual similarity alone cannot guarantee both filter evasion and preservation of the unsafe generation intent, wasting effort on low-potential candidates. We observe that the filter and the generator process the same prompt under different objectives and representations, and term this gap the Filter-Generator Discrepancy (FGD), which allows a perturbation to reduce a prompt's perceived risk to the filter while preserving the visual concept needed by the generator. Building on FGD, we propose a zero-query jailbreak framework that screens perturbations into a high-potential candidate set via observable discrepancy rules at the tokenization and semantic stages, and then performs a surrogate-ensemble evolutionary search that requires no access to the target. Experiments on six black-box pipelines and a commercial online service show that our method consistently outperforms representative baselines, raising the average attack success rate to 29.2\% (MHSC) and 33.3\% (Q16) across the six pipelines and improving over the strongest baseline by about 8 and 12 percentage points, respectively.

Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2608.00973 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2608.00973v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.00973 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 305 words

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