Meta - Physics I: Why don't we live in the Game of Life?

2.0.1 Without further ado, let's actually start thinking about physics. 2.1 Materialism, computational functionalism 2.1.1 First I'm gonna describe a "baseline physicalist computational-functionalist worldview", which is, IMO, a very powerful and predictive way of seeing the world. 2.1.2 Firstly, physicalism. Here are the main tenets of (my preferred version of) physicalism: 2.1.2.1 Everything that exists is physical. Things are either primitive physical entities such as strings or quantum fields, or are composites made up of the primitive entities. This includes minds. There exists a precise mathematical formalism describing the primitive entities(which we may not fully know yet) 2.1.2.2 Everything that happens is due to the laws of physics, which are mathematical equations which dictate the evolution of the state of the primitive entities(in some cases probabilistically). 2.1.2.3 The universe has a finite past and began in a simple low-entropy state. Mind-possessing things like humans and animals are the result of evolutionary processes. 2.1.2.4 The laws of physics are computable, meaning they can be evaluated using a Turing machine. Thus everything that exists in reality can be emulated on a computer. You could think of reality as running on a big Turing machine. 2.1.2.4.1 (In fact it's a bit more parsimonious to think of the laws being executed in parallel, like a cellular automaton, and on a quantum computer. But this doesn't change the picture fundamentally) 2.1.2.5 We actually know explicitly the laws of physics determining everything relevant to everyday life, including the functioning of the human mind. 2.1.3 I think this worldview is a great one. Using it, you can make many correct predictions and observations. 2.1.3.1 It's worth thinking a bit about how we got here. Back in the day, it wasn't clear that everything was physical, or that uniform physical laws existed, although some people(such as Democritus) held that the world was solely physical. 2.1.3.2 Newton's derivation of the elliptical movement of the planets was the first big success for precise mathematical laws. Other disciplines such as chemistry explained other parts of the world and were gradually shown to be consistent with a single set of physical laws. 2.1.3.3 The sheer age of the universe and Darwinian evolution explained how complex structures such as humans could come to exist from simple initial conditions. 2.1.4 While the physicalist worldview is a very powerful one, it is lacking some things which one would need from a comprehensive theory of reality. One prominent issue: the relation of our experiences and minds to the physical state is not clear. 2.1.4.1 One powerful theory of the mind within physicalism is computational functionalism. This philosophy holds that the mind can be thought of as an algorithm running on the hardware of our brain. Subjective experiences, thoughts, etc. emerge from, and have functional roles within, this algorithm. In principle, the same algorithm could be run on different hardware and give rise to the same mental states. 2.1.4.2 This is roughly the dominant view of the mind around these parts(i.e. within rationalist-adjacent circles). However, taking it very seriously can lead to some strange places... 2.1.4.2.1* (exploration of odd rationalist metaphysics; bit of a tangent) If the same algorithm can be run on different hardware yet give rise to the same experience, this opens up the possibility that we could be in a simulation. How should we allocate probability between the different possible copies? Even worse, there are seemingly infinitely many possible ways of interpreting physics as 'performing computation' and hence infinitely many copies of us. 2.1.4.2.2* This, combined with Bayesianism and the theory of Solomonoff induction, naturally leads one to assign a weighting to different copies based on their algorithmic complexity. At this point, it is tempting to discard the notion of a privileged physical reality altogether, regarding "reality" as simply one of an infinity of simplicity-weighted mathematical structures in which we happen to be instantiated. 2.1.4.2.3* Pondering decision theory can lead to the further radical step of abandoning the algorithmic weighting over mathematical structures, re-interpreting it in terms of preferences. In this metaphysics, the only real things are your present existence, the decisions you can make, and your utility function over all possible mathematical structures. Having reached this point, however, fundamental issues remain(where does your utility function come from? How does your "mathematical intuition" decide which actions will lead to which consequences?) and it is difficult to see how to make further progress. 2.1.5 Other problematic areas in physicalism include the interpretation of quantum mechanics(MWI is a pretty good response IMO) and the exact relation between the base laws and higher-level entities(related to the computation-physic