aiqbench analysis
This research identifies a critical security flaw in multi-tenant AI agent architectures where shared vector stores enable incidental cross-user memory leakage without malicious exploits. The study demonstrates that standard retrieval mechanisms can return another user's data with high probability, often generating responses rated as helpful by humans despite the contamination. Effective mitigation requires implementing hard post-retrieval ownership gating, which restores data isolation at a negligible latency cost of approximately 1.4ms per query.
MemLeak: Cross-User Semantic Leakage in Multi-Tenant AI Agent Memory
arXiv:2610.04195v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100\% under pooled {same-team} retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100\% top-$k$ placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of $+0.416$ to $+0.511$ under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet~4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across {two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4~ms per query.
Abstract:Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100\% under pooled {same-team} retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100\% top-$k$ placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of $+0.416$ to $+0.511$ under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet~4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across {two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4~ms per query.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.04195 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2610.04195v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.04195 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 263 words
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