aiqbench analysis
This research identifies "token-level memorization asymmetry" in fine-tuned diffusion language models, proposing Q-Skew as a superior metric for detecting membership inference attacks and potential PII extraction risks. The study expands the privacy evaluation landscape beyond autoregressive LMs to address critical security gaps in emerging generative paradigms like DLMs.
Membership Inference in Fine-tuned Diffusion Language Models via Token-level Memorization Asymmetry
arXiv:2609.00873v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as an alternative modeling paradigm to autoregressive LMs, offering advantages such as parallel generation and bidirectional context modeling. Despite growing interest in their generative capabilities, the privacy risks of DLMs remain underexplored. We identify a phenomenon termed token-level memorization asymmetry through theoretical analysis of diffusion training dynamics. Building on this finding, we propose Q-Skew, a quantile-weighted skewness-based indicator for membership inference on finetuned DLMs. Experiments across multiple fine-tuning datasets and models show that our method outperforms existing baselines. Moreover, we show that Q-Skew can also facilitate other privacy violations, such as PII extraction. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy attack surface and highlight the need for systematic privacy evaluation of DLMs.
Abstract:Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as an alternative modeling paradigm to autoregressive LMs, offering advantages such as parallel generation and bidirectional context modeling. Despite growing interest in their generative capabilities, the privacy risks of DLMs remain underexplored. We identify a phenomenon termed token-level memorization asymmetry through theoretical analysis of diffusion training dynamics. Building on this finding, we propose Q-Skew, a quantile-weighted skewness-based indicator for membership inference on finetuned DLMs. Experiments across multiple fine-tuning datasets and models show that our method outperforms existing baselines. Moreover, we show that Q-Skew can also facilitate other privacy violations, such as PII extraction. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy attack surface and highlight the need for systematic privacy evaluation of DLMs.
18 pages. EMNLP 2026 (Findings)
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
arXiv:2609.00873 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2609.00873v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.00873 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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