Malleability of transformations on the ciphertext in noisy Quantum public key encryption

Abstract:We characterize a noisy variant of a Quantum public encryption protocol recently introduced by Malavolta and Walter which demonstrated that the notion of everlasting security can be rigorously formulated for Quantum key distribution after two rounds of interaction between Alice and Bob. To address one possible direction of research that is related to injecting noise in the cryptographic protocol related to Quantum key distribution we formulate arguments for further examining the notion of everlasting security through malleability assumptions on transformations of the ciphertext. Assumptions surrounding malleability were introduced by Maurer and Tackmann for the purposes of comparing how authenticate then encrypt, and encrypt then authenticate, protocols behave through a variety of expressions for the forwarding error, deleting error, and reconstruction probabilities. Such probabilities are put to further use for obtaining connections between the indistinguishability and security threshold for a cryptographic protocol of interests. To further build upon such associations we demonstrate, through an adaptation of the Gentle Measurement Lemma from Quantum information theory, how upper bounds on the trace distance can be used to generalize the negligibility function obtained by Malavolta and Walter in the noiseless setting. Besides the fact that the negligibility function in the noisy setting is related to a higher security threshold it continues to remain of interest to determine whether computations provided in this work for upper bounding the trace distance can be related to other settings that are centered more on game-theoretic approaches.

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Quantum Physics (quant-ph); Probability (math.PR)

arXiv:2607.26086 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2607.26086v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.26086 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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