aiqbench analysis
This research advances strategic LLM capabilities by grounding Bayesian Persuasion in natural dialogue without relying on unrealistic pre-commitment assumptions. The study demonstrates that narrating potential agent types allows models to dynamically construct information schemas, enabling genuine belief updates that outperform standard baselines in both logical credibility and emotional resonance. Furthermore, the findings indicate that supervised fine-tuning can equip smaller models with persuasive performance comparable to much larger architectures, offering a more efficient path for deploying strategic AI agents.
Make an Offer They Can't Refuse: Grounding Bayesian Persuasion in Real-World Dialogues without Pre-Commitment
arXiv:2510.13387v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) still struggle with strategic persuasion, largely because existing approaches either neglect information asymmetry or rely on unrealistic pre-commitment assumptions. We introduce a type-induced commitment-communication mechanism that grounds Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language dialogue without pre-commitment: the persuader narrates their potential types (e.g., honest vs. dishonest) to dynamically construct an information schema, enabling the persuadee to perform Bayesian belief updates within the conversation itself. We implement two variants: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL), evaluating them against strong baselines across multiple LLMs and human judges. BP strategies consistently outperform baselines: SFNL excels in logical credibility, while FNL shows superior robustness and emotional resonance. We verify that gains stem from genuine Bayesian reasoning rather than superficial formatting, and we further show that supervised fine-tuning enables small models to match the persuasive performance of much larger ones.
Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) still struggle with strategic persuasion, largely because existing approaches either neglect information asymmetry or rely on unrealistic pre-commitment assumptions. We introduce a type-induced commitment-communication mechanism that grounds Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language dialogue without pre-commitment: the persuader narrates their potential types (e.g., honest vs. dishonest) to dynamically construct an information schema, enabling the persuadee to perform Bayesian belief updates within the conversation itself. We implement two variants: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL), evaluating them against strong baselines across multiple LLMs and human judges. BP strategies consistently outperform baselines: SFNL excels in logical credibility, while FNL shows superior robustness and emotional resonance. We verify that gains stem from genuine Bayesian reasoning rather than superficial formatting, and we further show that supervised fine-tuning enables small models to match the persuasive performance of much larger ones.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
arXiv:2510.13387 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2510.13387v3 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2510.13387 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 237 words
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