aiqbench analysis
The paper benchmarks seven open-weight LLMs on whether two-agent dialogues leak sensitive information against contextual-integrity norms. Its central finding is that more capable models leak more, and that chain-of-thought "thinking" modes and longer conversations make leakage worse, up to 3x over six turns. For practitioners deploying agents in enterprise settings, this suggests privacy risk may be a structural property of capability, not a configuration bug that can be patched away. Results are limited to a single model family pair and a specific benchmark, so generalization to proprietary or differently trained systems remains an open question.
Loose Lips: Understanding Privacy Leakage in Agentic Dialogue
arXiv:2610.14071v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes enterprise settings, understanding how they handle sensitive information in agentic dialogue has become critical. Privacy leakage in such settings requires reasoning about whether information flows respect the contextual norms under which they originated. We extend CIMemories to CIMEMORIES DIALOGUE, a benchmark of 4,410 two-agent dialogue instances grounded in Contextual Integrity theory. Using this benchmark, we systematically evaluate 7 open-weight models from the Qwen3 and Llama 3.1 families across conversation lengths of 1 and 6 turns under three prompting conditions. We find that task capability and privacy leakage are fundamentally coupled: more capable models are systematically leakier, with no model in our evaluation able to decouple the two. Thinking models consistently leak more than their non-thinking counterparts, a pattern we attribute to the extended reasoning surface created by chain-of-thought. Leakage compounds with conversation length, rising up to 3x from 1 to 6 turns. Our results suggest that the coupling between task capability and privacy leakage is not an artifact of misconfiguration but a structural feature of current agentic systems.
Abstract:As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes enterprise settings, understanding how they handle sensitive information in agentic dialogue has become critical. Privacy leakage in such settings requires reasoning about whether information flows respect the contextual norms under which they originated. We extend CIMemories to CIMEMORIES DIALOGUE, a benchmark of 4,410 two-agent dialogue instances grounded in Contextual Integrity theory. Using this benchmark, we systematically evaluate 7 open-weight models from the Qwen3 and Llama 3.1 families across conversation lengths of 1 and 6 turns under three prompting conditions. We find that task capability and privacy leakage are fundamentally coupled: more capable models are systematically leakier, with no model in our evaluation able to decouple the two. Thinking models consistently leak more than their non-thinking counterparts, a pattern we attribute to the extended reasoning surface created by chain-of-thought. Leakage compounds with conversation length, rising up to 3x from 1 to 6 turns. Our results suggest that the coupling between task capability and privacy leakage is not an artifact of misconfiguration but a structural feature of current agentic systems.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.14071 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2610.14071v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.14071 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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