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This research identifies a numerical side channel in floating-point arithmetic that allows attackers to recover hidden common additive components in language model logits, bypassing standard API protections. By exploiting representable spacing at binary exponent boundaries, the authors demonstrate exact recovery of logit vectors with minimal token queries across multiple inference engines and model families. The study provides a concrete mitigation strategy—subtracting the maximum value before bias addition—to eliminate this specific disclosure vulnerability.
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Logit Leakage through Floating-Point Bias Addition

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.16790v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language model APIs can expose token-specific biases while withholding logits and token probabilities. Existing bias-based extraction recovers relative logits, leaving a common additive component undetermined in ideal arithmetic. We identify a numerical side channel in floating-point bias addition that exposes information about this component through token identities alone. The channel distinguishes score vectors with identical complete unperturbed log probabilities. Our method exploits changes in representable spacing at binary exponent boundaries. Under the stated binary32 arithmetic assumptions and a known reachable score interval, it recovers a logit pair and its unknown tie-breaking priority exactly in at most 52 token queries. Given complete relative logits, one recovered anchor determines the original logit vector. We evaluate recovery across 11 public checkpoints from seven model families and extend the local method with adaptive interval search and anchor selection. In end-to-end experiments with vLLM, SGLang, and llama.cpp, adaptive recovery succeeds on all 128 Qwen3-0.6B inputs per system, including 64 held-out inputs. A separate token-only experiment extracts a pretrained small model's complete output-head representation up to an invertible hidden-basis transformation. We also establish a sufficient condition for suppressing common-shift disclosure by subtracting the maximum before bias addition. In controlled experiments, this mitigation eliminates all observed distinctions between common-shift variants and preserves token decisions under the tested random biases.

Abstract:Language model APIs can expose token-specific biases while withholding logits and token probabilities. Existing bias-based extraction recovers relative logits, leaving a common additive component undetermined in ideal arithmetic. We identify a numerical side channel in floating-point bias addition that exposes information about this component through token identities alone. The channel distinguishes score vectors with identical complete unperturbed log probabilities. Our method exploits changes in representable spacing at binary exponent boundaries. Under the stated binary32 arithmetic assumptions and a known reachable score interval, it recovers a logit pair and its unknown tie-breaking priority exactly in at most 52 token queries. Given complete relative logits, one recovered anchor determines the original logit vector. We evaluate recovery across 11 public checkpoints from seven model families and extend the local method with adaptive interval search and anchor selection. In end-to-end experiments with vLLM, SGLang, and this http URL, adaptive recovery succeeds on all 128 Qwen3-0.6B inputs per system, including 64 held-out inputs. A separate token-only experiment extracts a pretrained small model's complete output-head representation up to an invertible hidden-basis transformation. We also establish a sufficient condition for suppressing common-shift disclosure by subtracting the maximum before bias addition. In controlled experiments, this mitigation eliminates all observed distinctions between common-shift variants and preserves token decisions under the tested random biases.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.16790 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2610.16790v1 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.16790 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 312 words

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