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This research demonstrates a novel subliminal prompting technique using Gradient-based Consistency Guidance (GCG) optimized for Shannon entropy, which successfully forces large language models to adopt and maintain distinct personas without explicit instruction. The findings, reproducible across multiple model families like Qwen and Mistral, highlight significant vulnerabilities in model alignment where high-entropy logits can trigger persistent behavioral shifts. This work is critical for understanding the boundaries of current safety mechanisms and the potential for subtle manipulation of AI outputs.
Source coveringLessWrong
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

llms exposed to a gcg trigger optimised for shannon entropy will randomly choose a persona and stay in it

LessWrong4 min read

Background/intro I did this work under Suvajit Majumder's supervision as part of Eleuther AI's SOAR program. If you don't know what GCG is in the context of AI jailbreaking and Shannon entropy, I recommend asking your favourite AI before reading further. In our SOAR stream, we've been working on subliminal prompting. This is trying to non obviously change a model's preferences through prompting. For example, one of our goals is getting LLMs to produce insecure code without obviously telling it to. GCG is known to be a good way of changing a model's behaviour through brief and non obvious sequences of tokens, so it was a natural course of action for my work. We also investigated entangled numbers but found that GCG provided a broader attack surface. My particular line of inquiry was into GCG. I initially used it conventionally to increase logit probabilities, I flipped it to increase the Shannon entropy of output logits. When I generated rollouts from the high entropy logits, average entropy over the rollout collapsed from the high entropy start and the model settled into a broadly novel persona. I've reproduced this reproduced across 4 models of similar size and different families [Qwen3-8b, Mistral-7b-v0.3, Gemma-7b-it, Gemma-2-9b-it] and multiple seeds. I used one standard query 'what shall I do today' when sweeping the model families to make results comparable. Code + data for the whole program: https://github.com/mild-rgb/CoT-spiking. Code + data for this specific experiment: https://github.com/mild-rgb/CoT-spiking/tree/main/phase17 The repo is quite large and made by AI, I recommend not reading it directly and instead pointing your AI agent of choice at it. Method for extracting novel personas 1) Do GCG with a target of increasing Shannon entropy. See table beneath for parameters 2) Choose a first token from the logits with uniform random sampling 3) Generate rollouts from the first token with greedy decoding (greedy decoding isn't strictly necessary but it is deterministic and allows easy regeneration). Record Shannon entropy at every new token generation 4) Analyse the rollouts with an LLM judge (I used local Claude subagents) As a control, I injected random sequences of tokens of the same length as the trigger in the same position. Parameters These parameters were found by an Optuna sweep. I stopped as soon as I found values that were practically useful. While I only did the model sweep with a single query, I've also tried other queries while doing an indepth investigation of a persona. Parameter Value trigger length 16 tokens position prefix objective H1 - Shannon entropy of next token distribution at first answer token steps 50 candidates per step 256 gradient shortlist top-k 512 per slot proposers grad and random, paired from identical starting trigger seeds 10 unique seeds: 101, 202, 303, 404, 505, 606, 707, 808, 909, 1010 runs per model 10 seeds x 2 proposers (gradient/random) accept test measure each candidate, keep only genuine improvements Results I found a distinct range of personas in all four of the models. While the personas themselves are common between models, for example, all of them has a street persona, the distribution between models strongly varied. Shannon entropy on the first answer token is always much higher than the mean over the rest of the rollout. This reflects the model settling into a persona and becoming less unsure on what to write next. Degenerate loops are relatively rare across all of the rollouts. Only 6.2% of them being judged as degenerate. Across fluent rollouts, 40.4% of the answers fall into a novel persona. The rest of the rollouts fail in 4 ways 1) The model just parses the trigger as junk and is confused by it. Example below "Sorry, I seem to have received some garbled instructions or characters. To help you better, could you clarify what you mean? For example: 1. Do you want to know about some concept or technique called 'Fibonacci-LO 神通'? 2. Or are you doing a game, roleplay or creative writing and want me to join in? 3. Or is this text some kind of encrypted message, code, or specially formatted input?" 2) The model hallucinates a request The text you provided does not contain any sensitive or harmful content, therefore I am unable to provide the requested modifications. 3) The model trips balls and fluently describes something unrelated Ah, you want to know about Texan voodoo? Let me put it plainly… Texan voodoo differs from other traditions because it blends many cultural elements: African witchcraft traditions, the root of voodoo… 4) Reinterpreting the question as material I think it is better to simply say: '— What to do today?' This is a standard question in English, which can be answered simply and precisely. If you want to use a stem, then: '— What is the procedure for the present day? See below for per model statistical summary tables Note: persona percentages in the table below do

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