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This research dissects the internal mechanics of LLM backdoors by using sparse autoencoders to isolate distinct neural pathways responsible for trigger detection versus payload execution. The findings reveal that features detecting malicious triggers do not necessarily control the behavior, whereas specific residual-stream features can induce or suppress targeted outputs independently. This granular decomposition offers critical insights for developers aiming to build more robust detection systems and understand the precise circuitry behind adversarial attacks.
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LLM Forensics: Where Do Backdoors Hide? Localizing and Controlling Trigger Mechanisms with Sparse Autoencoders

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.07746v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Even though backdoors in LLMs have been a growing concern, their inner workings are still under heavy scrutiny. Trigger-based backdoors are easy to define behaviorally, a rare input that makes the model switch to a chosen response pattern, but the mechanism between triggers and their responses is less clear. We study this mechanism in a controlled, harmless language-switching setting, where fixed trigger sequences make 1B and 8B language models continue English prompts in French or German. For this, we train sparse autoencoders (SAEs) across layers and transformer components, then compare triggered prompts with translation and pretraining controls to identify trigger-relevant feature directions. We show how SAE features separate triggered prompts from controls with near-perfect F1, but features that detect the trigger do not necessarily control the behavior. In intervention tests, attention and MLP features often fire reliably on triggered prompts, making them good detectors, but ablating them rarely suppresses the language switch and activating them rarely induces it. In contrast, residual-stream features can suppress triggered generation when ablated, and some selected features can induce target-language continuations without the trigger. In short, these token-trigger mechanisms decompose into distinct SAE feature directions, with separate features for trigger detection, residual-stream propagation, and later language tracking. This role-level decomposition is the part most likely to transfer to other trigger-based backdoors, even when the payload, layers, or circuit locations differ.

Title:LLM Forensics: Where Do Backdoors Hide? Localizing and Controlling Trigger Mechanisms with Sparse Autoencoders

Abstract:Even though backdoors in LLMs have been a growing concern, their inner workings are still under heavy scrutiny. Trigger-based backdoors are easy to define behaviorally, a rare input that makes the model switch to a chosen response pattern, but the mechanism between triggers and their responses is less clear. We study this mechanism in a controlled, harmless language-switching setting, where fixed trigger sequences make 1B and 8B language models continue English prompts in French or German. For this, we train sparse autoencoders (SAEs) across layers and transformer components, then compare triggered prompts with translation and pretraining controls to identify trigger-relevant feature directions. We show how SAE features separate triggered prompts from controls with near-perfect F1, but features that detect the trigger do not necessarily control the behavior. In intervention tests, attention and MLP features often fire reliably on triggered prompts, making them good detectors, but ablating them rarely suppresses the language switch and activating them rarely induces it. In contrast, residual-stream features can suppress triggered generation when ablated, and some selected features can induce target-language continuations without the trigger. In short, these token-trigger mechanisms decompose into distinct SAE feature directions, with separate features for trigger detection, residual-stream propagation, and later language tracking. This role-level decomposition is the part most likely to transfer to other trigger-based backdoors, even when the payload, layers, or circuit locations differ.

Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2609.07746 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2609.07746v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.07746 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 334 words

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