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This study identifies a critical privacy vulnerability in on-policy distillation where student models inadvertently leak membership information about the sensitive data used to train their teachers. The authors introduce "Leaky," a novel detection method that significantly outperforms existing baselines by analyzing token log-probability gaps across fresh trajectories. These findings highlight an urgent need for robust security protocols when deploying distilled models in high-stakes domains like healthcare and code generation.
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Leaky Students: Membership Inference against On-Policy Distillation

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.33136v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student to match a teacher's next-token distributions on student-generated trajectories. However, privileged information supplied to the teacher for OPD training may contain sensitive data. Whether the student leaks private information about the records supplied to the teacher during distillation remains poorly understood. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first systematic study of membership inference in this setting. We find that fresh student trajectories expose sparse membership signals that fixed reference-answer losses often miss. These signals are mixed with probability changes caused by training on other records. We introduce Leaky, which samples fresh trajectories from the target model and compares its token log-probabilities with the maximum across matched reference models trained without the candidate records. It applies Leaky ReLU to the resulting gaps, preserving positive gaps and downweighting negative gaps as an approximate correction for incidental positive gaps in non-members. Across fifteen targets spanning mathematics, medical question answering, and code generation, Leaky outperforms all evaluated baselines and achieves mean AUROC 0.875, compared with 0.614 for the strongest baseline on each target in the main evaluation. On the same sampled trajectories, the strongest baseline achieves mean AUROC 0.826. These results show that students trained through OPD can expose the membership of records used for teacher supervision, even when fixed reference-answer losses provide little evidence of membership.

Abstract:On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student to match a teacher's next-token distributions on student-generated trajectories. However, privileged information supplied to the teacher for OPD training may contain sensitive data. Whether the student leaks private information about the records supplied to the teacher during distillation remains poorly understood. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first systematic study of membership inference in this setting. We find that fresh student trajectories expose sparse membership signals that fixed reference-answer losses often miss. These signals are mixed with probability changes caused by training on other records. We introduce Leaky, which samples fresh trajectories from the target model and compares its token log-probabilities with the maximum across matched reference models trained without the candidate records. It applies Leaky ReLU to the resulting gaps, preserving positive gaps and downweighting negative gaps as an approximate correction for incidental positive gaps in non-members. Across fifteen targets spanning mathematics, medical question answering, and code generation, Leaky outperforms all evaluated baselines and achieves mean AUROC 0.875, compared with 0.614 for the strongest baseline on each target in the main evaluation. On the same sampled trajectories, the strongest baseline achieves mean AUROC 0.826. These results show that students trained through OPD can expose the membership of records used for teacher supervision, even when fixed reference-answer losses provide little evidence of membership.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2609.33136 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2609.33136v1 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.33136 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 320 words

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