aiqbench analysis
LASER is a novel proof-carrying search method designed to resolve long-range dependencies in protocol specifications by treating missing evidence as explicit obligations rather than errors. The approach significantly improves accuracy over local readers and reduces false discoveries when verifying complex, sparse rule sets where transitions inherit states from remote blocks. This advancement directly addresses critical challenges in formal verification for AI-driven systems that rely on rigorous, defensible protocol logic.
LASER: Defeasible Certificate Search for Long-Range Protocol Dependencies
arXiv:2610.14552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Protocol specifications rarely justify executable behavior in one place: a transition may inherit its source state from a remote control block, name its events only by number, and remain subject to a later correction. Recovering the nearby clause is therefore insufficient; the system must assemble a source-linked certificate and determine whether any stronger rule applies. We introduce LASER, a proof-carrying search method for sparse, defeasible protocol evidence. LASER represents missing support and unresolved corrections as explicit obligations, searches typed evidence routes, and lets an occurrence-aware symbolic checker alone decide whether a certificate warrants, refutes, or leaves a behavior unresolved. On 91 BehaviorCheck families under a matched 2K budget, LASER improves Joint Edge+Proof over the strongest local reader on two model families ($\Delta=+.132$, $p=.017$; $\Delta=+.198$, $p<.001$) while cutting false discoveries by 2--3$\times$. Controlled replays attribute the gain and its limits: neither reference routing nor deterministic citation expansion alone exceeds the local baseline; whole-document reading (29--65K tokens), two-round iterative retrieval, and even oracle minimal-certificate evidence all fail to reach LASER, localizing the bottleneck in typed obligation closure rather than evidence access. An authority-corruption replay shows source-link errors only cause abstention, while the only unsafe-warrant mechanism is mis-recording a Held erratum as Verified, confined to that erratum's family. LASER thus improves long-range dependency recovery while converting incomplete evidence and uncertain authority into explicit residual obligations rather than unsupported behavior.
Abstract:Protocol specifications rarely justify executable behavior in one place: a transition may inherit its source state from a remote control block, name its events only by number, and remain subject to a later correction. Recovering the nearby clause is therefore insufficient; the system must assemble a source-linked certificate and determine whether any stronger rule applies. We introduce LASER, a proof-carrying search method for sparse, defeasible protocol evidence. LASER represents missing support and unresolved corrections as explicit obligations, searches typed evidence routes, and lets an occurrence-aware symbolic checker alone decide whether a certificate warrants, refutes, or leaves a behavior unresolved. On 91 BehaviorCheck families under a matched 2K budget, LASER improves Joint Edge+Proof over the strongest local reader on two model families ($\Delta=+.132$, $p=.017$; $\Delta=+.198$, $p<.001$) while cutting false discoveries by 2--3$\times$. Controlled replays attribute the gain and its limits: neither reference routing nor deterministic citation expansion alone exceeds the local baseline; whole-document reading (29--65K tokens), two-round iterative retrieval, and even oracle minimal-certificate evidence all fail to reach LASER, localizing the bottleneck in typed obligation closure rather than evidence access. An authority-corruption replay shows source-link errors only cause abstention, while the only unsafe-warrant mechanism is mis-recording a Held erratum as Verified, confined to that erratum's family. LASER thus improves long-range dependency recovery while converting incomplete evidence and uncertain authority into explicit residual obligations rather than unsupported behavior.
Software Engineering (cs.SE); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
I.2.3; I.2.7; D.2.4
arXiv:2610.14552 [cs.SE]
(or arXiv:2610.14552v1 [cs.SE] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.14552 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 326 words
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