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This study reveals that frontier LLMs like GPT-4o and Claude 3.7 exhibit a "Bayesian hypocrisy" similar to humans, condemning others for using Bayesian reasoning while failing to recognize the same flaw in themselves. The research highlights a critical dissociation between self-performance and other-judgment in these models, suggesting caution when deploying them in domains requiring strict statistical fidelity or fairness norms.
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Large Language Models Exhibit Human-Like Bayesian Hypocrisy

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.35779v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Given recent achievements of large language models (LLMs), frontier models are expected to perform well on Bayesian reasoning tasks, at least as well as humans. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that LLMs will condemn others who offer those very same Bayesian judgments, a fallibility observed in human decision-making (Cao, et al., 2019). In 5 experiments with 48 experimental conditions employing over 5,000 trials, GPT-4o and Claude 3.7 Sonnet were tested on two variations of a Bayesian reasoning task. We also assessed LLM evaluation of the competence and morality of a hypothetical person who had offered the same reasoning task as them. LLMs hovered near human performance on the Bayesian task, though their reasoning was more rule-based and rigid. Surprisingly, like humans but to a greater extent, LLMs also demonstrated the same hypocrisy in condemning others who, like them, had deployed Bayes' rule. In demonstrating Bayesian hypocrisy, LLMs highlight a humanlike error of a dissociation between self-performance and other-judgment, and caution against their use in domains where statistical fidelity and fairness norms collide.

Abstract:Given recent achievements of large language models (LLMs), frontier models are expected to perform well on Bayesian reasoning tasks, at least as well as humans. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect that LLMs will condemn others who offer those very same Bayesian judgments, a fallibility observed in human decision-making (Cao, et al., 2019). In 5 experiments with 48 experimental conditions employing over 5,000 trials, GPT-4o and Claude 3.7 Sonnet were tested on two variations of a Bayesian reasoning task. We also assessed LLM evaluation of the competence and morality of a hypothetical person who had offered the same reasoning task as them. LLMs hovered near human performance on the Bayesian task, though their reasoning was more rule-based and rigid. Surprisingly, like humans but to a greater extent, LLMs also demonstrated the same hypocrisy in condemning others who, like them, had deployed Bayes' rule. In demonstrating Bayesian hypocrisy, LLMs highlight a humanlike error of a dissociation between self-performance and other-judgment, and caution against their use in domains where statistical fidelity and fairness norms collide.

Main text (38 pages) with supplementary materials appended (213 pages total). Preregistered with data and analysis code at this https URL

Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY)

arXiv:2609.35779 [cs.HC]

(or arXiv:2609.35779v1 [cs.HC] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.35779 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 295 words

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