aiqbench analysis
This research establishes a new benchmark, KAN-Robust-Bench, specifically designed to evaluate the adversarial robustness of Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks against evasion attacks like FGSM and PGD. By combining mathematical foundations for randomized smoothing with empirical testing, the study identifies optimal defense strategies for these emerging neural architectures. The work advances the field by addressing critical security vulnerabilities inherent in next-generation machine learning models.
KAN-Robust-Bench: A Benchmark for Evaluating the Robustness of Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks
arXiv:2608.21488v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in many domains, these models have shown profound vulnerabilities when they are exposed to adversarial threats. While adversarial attacks fall into various categories, the most prominent category in research studies is evasion. In evasion attacks, the adversary generates perturbed versions of samples, which might not be observable by human eyes. These samples generally fool the machine learning models with high confidence. This phenomenon poses a significant security violation against machine learning models. In this paper, we investigate the certified and empirical robustness of various Kolmogorov-Arnold network architectures against strong evasion attacks. At first, we provide the mathematical foundations for randomized smoothing and interval bound propagation, and report the $\ell_2$-certified robustness of the models under randomized smoothing. After that, we systematically evaluate the robustness of various defended and undefended KAN models under FGSM, PGD, and C&W attacks in order to find out the optimal defense strategies and architectures.
Abstract:While machine learning models have demonstrated strong performance in many domains, these models have shown profound vulnerabilities when they are exposed to adversarial threats. While adversarial attacks fall into various categories, the most prominent category in research studies is evasion. In evasion attacks, the adversary generates perturbed versions of samples, which might not be observable by human eyes. These samples generally fool the machine learning models with high confidence. This phenomenon poses a significant security violation against machine learning models. In this paper, we investigate the certified and empirical robustness of various Kolmogorov-Arnold network architectures against strong evasion attacks. At first, we provide the mathematical foundations for randomized smoothing and interval bound propagation, and report the $\ell_2$-certified robustness of the models under randomized smoothing. After that, we systematically evaluate the robustness of various defended and undefended KAN models under FGSM, PGD, and C&W attacks in order to find out the optimal defense strategies and architectures.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2608.21488 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2608.21488v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.21488 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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