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This paper proposes a "Jevons hypothesis" for machine evaluation, suggesting that as the marginal cost of AI-driven assessment drops, organizations will increasingly rely on automated discernment rather than human judgment. It frames this shift not as an empirical fact but as a technological provocation to explore how cheap prediction redistributes decision authority and alters organizational commitment structures. The core argument centers on the transition from evaluation scarcity to abundance, fundamentally questioning the economic viability of human oversight in high-volume decision environments.
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Judgement in the Age of Jev: From Evaluation Scarcity to Evaluation Abundance

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.01231v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative artificial intelligence has reduced the cost of producing plausible symbolic artefacts, leading recent organisation scholarship to identify evaluation and discernment as constraints under conditions of production abundance. This perspective examines a further possibility: that machine evaluation itself becomes inexpensive enough to be deployed routinely and at scale. The investigation is prompted by Jev, TypeSafe AI's specialised model for typed probabilistic decisions. TypeSafe explicitly invokes William Stanley Jevons to argue that lower-cost machine intelligence can unlock previously uneconomic uses. Treating this as a technological provocation rather than an established empirical result, the article formulates a conditional Jevons hypothesis for machine evaluation: sufficiently large reductions in the total marginal cost of usable machine evaluation may increase its organisational consumption where latent demand is substantial and complementary costs do not dominate. The article integrates rebound economics with research on cheap prediction, production abundance, machine evaluation, decision allocation, authority, reliance and Executive Judgement to examine this possible scarcity transition. It distinguishes prediction, machine evaluation, organisational judgement and authorisation as functional activities whose costs need not fall together. Evaluations can share evidence, criteria and errors; scale mis-specified rubrics; operate on representations from which consequential qualifications have disappeared; and change practical decision rights through thresholds and exception routing. The resulting research problem is when cheap machine evaluation substitutes for human evaluative work, when it redistributes or creates demands for judgement, and how it affects the grounds available at consequential organisational commitment.

Abstract:Generative artificial intelligence has reduced the cost of producing plausible symbolic artefacts, leading recent organisation scholarship to identify evaluation and discernment as constraints under conditions of production abundance. This perspective examines a further possibility: that machine evaluation itself becomes inexpensive enough to be deployed routinely and at scale. The investigation is prompted by Jev, TypeSafe AI's specialised model for typed probabilistic decisions. TypeSafe explicitly invokes William Stanley Jevons to argue that lower-cost machine intelligence can unlock previously uneconomic uses. Treating this as a technological provocation rather than an established empirical result, the article formulates a conditional Jevons hypothesis for machine evaluation: sufficiently large reductions in the total marginal cost of usable machine evaluation may increase its organisational consumption where latent demand is substantial and complementary costs do not dominate. The article integrates rebound economics with research on cheap prediction, production abundance, machine evaluation, decision allocation, authority, reliance and Executive Judgement to examine this possible scarcity transition. It distinguishes prediction, machine evaluation, organisational judgement and authorisation as functional activities whose costs need not fall together. Evaluations can share evidence, criteria and errors; scale mis-specified rubrics; operate on representations from which consequential qualifications have disappeared; and change practical decision rights through thresholds and exception routing. The resulting research problem is when cheap machine evaluation substitutes for human evaluative work, when it redistributes or creates demands for judgement, and how it affects the grounds available at consequential organisational commitment.

Computers and Society (cs.CY); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.01231 [cs.CY]

(or arXiv:2610.01231v1 [cs.CY] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.01231 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 334 words

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