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This study applies a cybersecurity kill chain framework to analyze human perception of AI-generated disinformation, revealing that modern LLMs often produce text indistinguishable from human writing. The research highlights a critical asymmetry where detection accuracy degrades significantly under cognitive fatigue, while the ability to identify AI origin remains stable. These findings offer specific intervention points for building proactive defenses against scalable generative misinformation campaigns.
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Interrupting the Chain: Human Perception of AI-Generated Disinformation Through a Kill Chain Lens

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2608.21389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative AI enables customized misinformation at scale, yet defenses remain largely reactive. We present empirical findings from a human-subject study (n=504 participants, n=2,438 judgments) in which users classified news fragments by origin (human vs. machine) and veracity (real vs. fake). We organize results using an adapted cybersecurity kill chain as a taxonomy for intervention, mapping perception data onto stages of a cognitive attack lifecycle. Three key findings emerge: (1) a perception-accuracy gap where heightened suspicion does not improve detection; (2) modern LLMs frequently produce human-indistinguishable text; and (3) an asymmetric cognitive fatigue effect where fake-news detection degrades by 10.2 percentage points under sustained exposure while AI-origin detection remains stable. These findings identify candidate intervention points for proactive defense against AI-driven disinformation.

Abstract:Generative AI enables customized misinformation at scale, yet defenses remain largely reactive. We present empirical findings from a human-subject study (n=504 participants, n=2,438 judgments) in which users classified news fragments by origin (human vs. machine) and veracity (real vs. fake). We organize results using an adapted cybersecurity kill chain as a taxonomy for intervention, mapping perception data onto stages of a cognitive attack lifecycle. Three key findings emerge: (1) a perception-accuracy gap where heightened suspicion does not improve detection; (2) modern LLMs frequently produce human-indistinguishable text; and (3) an asymmetric cognitive fatigue effect where fake-news detection degrades by 10.2 percentage points under sustained exposure while AI-origin detection remains stable. These findings identify candidate intervention points for proactive defense against AI-driven disinformation.

Accepted at the GI 2026 workshop (LNI). 10 pages

Computers and Society (cs.CY); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

K.4.2; K.6.5; H.1.2; I.2.7

arXiv:2608.21389 [cs.CY]

(or arXiv:2608.21389v1 [cs.CY] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.21389 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 236 words

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