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Interpreting SSL Representations for Spoof Detection: a WavLM Study

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2610.23526v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Self-supervised speech models such as WavLM achieve strong spoofing detection performance, yet which layers encode the most spoof-relevant information and what acoustic properties they capture remain opaque. We present a layer-wise interpretability study of WavLM using the ASVspoof 5 database, combining three complementary analyses: (i) per-layer linear probing with attack-level evaluation across speech synthesis, voice conversion, and adversarial attacks; (ii) a canonical correlation analysis (CCA) linking layer representations to spoofing-relevant acoustic features; (iii) an exhaustive grid search over layer subsets showing that use of five layers outperforms full thirteen-layer pooling. CCA analysis reveals that, while most acoustic features peak in alignment with mid-layers and then decay, voice quality measures jitter, shimmer, and the harmonics-to-noise ratio show the opposite trend, with correlation increasing toward later layers. Embedding visualisations reveal that deeper layers capture a continuous acoustic similarity among attacks rather than discrete categories, suggesting these layers encode fundamental synthesis artifacts rather than attack-specific signatures.

Abstract:Self-supervised speech models such as WavLM achieve strong spoofing detection performance, yet which layers encode the most spoof-relevant information and what acoustic properties they capture remain opaque. We present a layer-wise interpretability study of WavLM using the ASVspoof 5 database, combining three complementary analyses: (i) per-layer linear probing with attack-level evaluation across speech synthesis, voice conversion, and adversarial attacks; (ii) a canonical correlation analysis (CCA) linking layer representations to spoofing-relevant acoustic features; (iii) an exhaustive grid search over layer subsets showing that use of five layers outperforms full thirteen-layer pooling. CCA analysis reveals that, while most acoustic features peak in alignment with mid-layers and then decay, voice quality measures jitter, shimmer, and the harmonics-to-noise ratio show the opposite trend, with correlation increasing toward later layers. Embedding visualisations reveal that deeper layers capture a continuous acoustic similarity among attacks rather than discrete categories, suggesting these layers encode fundamental synthesis artifacts rather than attack-specific signatures.

5 pages, 4 figures, 1 table. Published at IWBF 2026. An extended abstract of this work was presented as a poster at Odyssey 2026

Sound (cs.SD); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2610.23526 [cs.SD]

(or arXiv:2610.23526v1 [cs.SD] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.23526 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 273 words

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