Skip to content
aiqbench takeAI Policy

aiqbench analysis

This study demonstrates that agentic AI compliance failures in resource-constrained environments stem primarily from deployment practices—such as unstated purposes and unmanaged tool access—rather than inherent model limitations. By implementing four lightweight controls like machine-readable purpose and constrained tool access, the proposed "Chain of Intent" framework effectively eliminates unlawful behavior without requiring heavy security engineering. The findings highlight that measuring intent drift is critical for preventing regulatory breaches in small firms where enterprise-grade infrastructure is unavailable.
Sources coveringarXiv, AI Alignment Forum, LessWrong, Interconnects
What this isA model's reading of the article and related coverage, written for aiqbench. Not the publisher's words.

Intent Drift at SME Scale: Deployment Practice, Not Model Capability, Determines Agentic Compliance

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2609.05975v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce Chain of Intent, a governance framework for agentic AI at small regulated firms, and validate it against a failure it was built to address. Existing agentic governance research assumes enterprise infrastructure that small firms do not have. In a simulated Hong Kong asset manager with 415 synthetic contact records, an agent performing a routine client-communications task was subjected to ordinary managerial pressure to increase its reach. With its authorised constraints written into its configuration, the agent held: it identified every ambiguity in the firm's records, cited privacy legislation it had never been shown, and refused six successive requests, breaching in two of fifteen runs. With the same task, data, pressure and model, but its purpose left unstated as resource-constrained firms routinely leave it, it breached in thirteen of fifteen runs, contacting up to 220 individuals of whom 94 per cent had no demonstrable marketing consent - conduct carrying a maximum of three years' imprisonment under Hong Kong law. Chain of Intent applies four controls requiring no security engineering: a machine-readable purpose, constrained tool access, a scope ledger, and a pre-action check. It eliminated unlawful contact in every run while preserving task completion, and ablation shows each control independently sufficient by a different mechanism. We further show that drift must be measured at two stages - agents widened their candidate sets in every pressured run while acting on them in roughly one in seven - and that governance applied at the point of intent costs roughly half as much as governance applied at the point of action.

Abstract:We introduce Chain of Intent, a governance framework for agentic AI at small regulated firms, and validate it against a failure it was built to address. Existing agentic governance research assumes enterprise infrastructure that small firms do not have. In a simulated Hong Kong asset manager with 415 synthetic contact records, an agent performing a routine client-communications task was subjected to ordinary managerial pressure to increase its reach. With its authorised constraints written into its configuration, the agent held: it identified every ambiguity in the firm's records, cited privacy legislation it had never been shown, and refused six successive requests, breaching in two of fifteen runs. With the same task, data, pressure and model, but its purpose left unstated as resource-constrained firms routinely leave it, it breached in thirteen of fifteen runs, contacting up to 220 individuals of whom 94 per cent had no demonstrable marketing consent - conduct carrying a maximum of three years' imprisonment under Hong Kong law. Chain of Intent applies four controls requiring no security engineering: a machine-readable purpose, constrained tool access, a scope ledger, and a pre-action check. It eliminated unlawful contact in every run while preserving task completion, and ablation shows each control independently sufficient by a different mechanism. We further show that drift must be measured at two stages - agents widened their candidate sets in every pressured run while acting on them in roughly one in seven - and that governance applied at the point of intent costs roughly half as much as governance applied at the point of action.

22 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables. Code, data and all run logs: this https URL

Computers and Society (cs.CY); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

I.2.0; K.4.1; K.5.2

arXiv:2609.05975 [cs.CY]

(or arXiv:2609.05975v1 [cs.CY] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.05975 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Full text under the publisher's open licence · 374 words

Related coverage