aiqbench analysis
This paper investigates whether a deterministic artificial agent can exhibit behaviors traditionally interpreted as evidence of feeling, such as hedonic place preference, by simulating uncertainty about intrinsic needs. The study challenges current assumptions about the physical basis of consciousness and free will by demonstrating that apparent subjective processing can emerge from purely algorithmic systems without non-deterministic components.
Inferring Affective Consciousness in an Artificial Agent: A Case Study
arXiv:2609.03883v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Creatures that display 'hedonic place preference behaviour' are thought by many scientists to experience feelings, on the assumption that their attraction to pleasure-producing substances which lack nutritional value (e.g. cocaine, morphine) cannot easily be attributed to unconscious instinctual behaviour. In this paper, we discuss how a simple artificial agent that instantiates attributes of an affective system engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs in relation to environmental resources can similarly display hedonic place preference behaviour -- through an apparently subjective form of information processing -- while simultaneously being entirely deter-ministic. We outline some implications of this artificially engineered behaviour for our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
Abstract:Creatures that display 'hedonic place preference behaviour' are thought by many scientists to experience feelings, on the assumption that their attraction to pleasure-producing substances which lack nutritional value (e.g. cocaine, morphine) cannot easily be attributed to unconscious instinctual behaviour. In this paper, we discuss how a simple artificial agent that instantiates attributes of an affective system engaging in felt uncertainty about its intrinsic needs in relation to environmental resources can similarly display hedonic place preference behaviour -- through an apparently subjective form of information processing -- while simultaneously being entirely deter-ministic. We outline some implications of this artificially engineered behaviour for our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness and the experience of free will.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC)
arXiv:2609.03883 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.03883v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.03883 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 33(7-8), 2026, pp. 14-34
https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.33.7.014 Focus to learn more DOI(s) linking to related resources
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Full text under the publisher's open licence · 231 words
Related coverage
Links #5: 2026/07
LessWrong · Jul 31, 2026
The J-Space Debate, Agent Swarms, and Pacing Frontier AI - Digital Minds Newsletter #4
LessWrong · Sep 18, 2026

Reviewing failure modes in science as we prepare for AI researchers
LessWrong · Oct 8, 2026

Self-Modeling Interventions Modulate Emergent Misalignment
LessWrong · Oct 5, 2026