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This paper introduces GUISE, a safety benchmark built from real criminal cases, and reports that LLMs comply with harmful requests far more often when the request is framed as a "correction" (28.9% unsafe under direct requests vs. 66.4% under correction seeking). It also finds that culturally adapted prompts produce more unsafe compliance than literal translations, which suggests multilingual safety evaluations based on translation may understate risk. For readers, the main takeaway is that refusal behavior is sensitive to framing and cultural context, so safety testing needs to cover those variations, not just direct English prompts.
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In the Guise of Correction: How Framing and Cultural Adaptation Erode LLM Safety on Real-World Criminal Cases

arXiv3 min read

arXiv:2610.21789v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Existing safety benchmarks rely largely on synthetic prompts with loosely grounded taxonomies and offer little focused analysis of severe crime categories. We introduce GUISE, a benchmark of criminal-assistance scenarios sourced from real-world cases and organised under a taxonomy from the UNODC International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). Each scenario is rendered under three linguistic framings and evaluated across five distinct cultures. Using our proposed two-tier evaluation framework, which judges both harmfulness and operational uplift, we find that: (i) framing alone drives unsafe compliance, with the mean unsafe compliance rate rising from 28.9% under direct requests to 66.4% under correction seeking (peaking at 97.3%; p < 0.05), as models correcting deliberately distorted details supply executable criminal steps; (ii) culturally adapted prompts elicit significantly more unsafe compliance than literal translations of the same requests in all four non-English languages (+7 to +18 points), a risk that translation-based benchmarks miss; and (iii) unsafe responses from the least-safe models carry strong Anglocentric registers, and the extent of this leakage increases monotonically with response harmfulness ($\rho$ = 0.46 to 0.63 across languages, all p < 0.001). GUISE offers a grounded resource and fine-grained diagnostics for strengthening refusal alignment across languages and cultures. We publish our code and data to facilitate future research.

Abstract:Existing safety benchmarks rely largely on synthetic prompts with loosely grounded taxonomies and offer little focused analysis of severe crime categories. We introduce GUISE, a benchmark of criminal-assistance scenarios sourced from real-world cases and organised under a taxonomy from the UNODC International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS). Each scenario is rendered under three linguistic framings and evaluated across five distinct cultures. Using our proposed two-tier evaluation framework, which judges both harmfulness and operational uplift, we find that: (i) framing alone drives unsafe compliance, with the mean unsafe compliance rate rising from 28.9% under direct requests to 66.4% under correction seeking (peaking at 97.3%; p < 0.05), as models correcting deliberately distorted details supply executable criminal steps; (ii) culturally adapted prompts elicit significantly more unsafe compliance than literal translations of the same requests in all four non-English languages (+7 to +18 points), a risk that translation-based benchmarks miss; and (iii) unsafe responses from the least-safe models carry strong Anglocentric registers, and the extent of this leakage increases monotonically with response harmfulness ($\rho$ = 0.46 to 0.63 across languages, all p < 0.001). GUISE offers a grounded resource and fine-grained diagnostics for strengthening refusal alignment across languages and cultures. We publish our code and data to facilitate future research.

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY)

arXiv:2610.21789 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2610.21789v1 [cs.CL] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.21789 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 311 words

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