aiqbench analysis
The IAB workshop highlights critical deployment hurdles for post-quantum authentication, primarily driven by the massive increase in signature sizes that strain transport layers and break existing protocol limits. Practical implementation issues, such as oversized tokens and potential packet loss in DTLS 1.2, suggest that infrastructure modifications are required before widespread adoption of schemes like ML-DSA-65.
IAB workshop details four post-quantum authentication obstacles

From Quantum Zeitgeist
ExcerptIn October, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a two-day workshop in Prague with people who are deploying post-quantum authentication. Four obstacles came up again and again. “I implemented PQC and my biggest problem was escaped ampersands,” one participant shared, highlighting practical implementation issues beyond purely cryptographic concerns. The IAB plans to publish a full report detailing these obstacles and potential solutions.
The substantial increase in signature size presented by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is creating immediate deployment challenges, with an ML-DSA-65 signature reaching 3,309 bytes compared to the 64 bytes of an Ed25519 signature. These limitations extend beyond initial handshakes to affect signed requests, tokens and even long-term archival of data. Validating signatures, workshop attendees noted, is increasingly constrained by key size rather than the complexity of the underlying mathematics.
Excerpt shown under the publisher's RSS terms · 130 words · full text and figures are on the publisher's site
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