aiqbench analysis
This research addresses the incentive structures in LLM explainability, demonstrating that report-dependent auditing creates suppression biases where models hide important factors to avoid scrutiny. The authors propose incorporating a report-independent audit floor to ensure truthful disclosure of input factor influences under limited verification budgets. This work is critical for developing robust and trustworthy explanation systems that resist strategic manipulation by model outputs.
How the Audit Rule Shapes Faithful Factor Explanations in LLMs
arXiv:2610.01514v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are often asked which input factors influenced their outputs. For structured inputs, such reports can be checked by counterfactual perturbation, but each factor must be queried multiple times to estimate its effect, so verification is usually budget-limited. We study how this limited-budget setting changes the incentive to report factor-level influence truthfully. We formalize the interaction as a verification game and show that proper scoring alone is not enough when auditing depends on the report: report-dependent auditing creates a suppression incentive, because factors reported as important are more likely to be checked and penalized for estimation noise. In contrast, report-independent auditing, or a mixed rule with a small report-independent floor, removes this channel and makes truthful reporting preferable to full suppression. We instantiate the framework with the Counterfactual Brier Score (CBS) and evaluate its predictions on four NLP benchmarks. A synthetic rational agent matches the theoretical prediction exactly, and real LLMs follow the same incentives when they are made explicit. The main design implication is simple: under partial verification, factor-level explanation systems should include a report-independent audit component so that under-reporting cannot be used to avoid scrutiny.
Abstract:Large language models are often asked which input factors influenced their outputs. For structured inputs, such reports can be checked by counterfactual perturbation, but each factor must be queried multiple times to estimate its effect, so verification is usually budget-limited. We study how this limited-budget setting changes the incentive to report factor-level influence truthfully. We formalize the interaction as a verification game and show that proper scoring alone is not enough when auditing depends on the report: report-dependent auditing creates a suppression incentive, because factors reported as important are more likely to be checked and penalized for estimation noise. In contrast, report-independent auditing, or a mixed rule with a small report-independent floor, removes this channel and makes truthful reporting preferable to full suppression. We instantiate the framework with the Counterfactual Brier Score (CBS) and evaluate its predictions on four NLP benchmarks. A synthetic rational agent matches the theoretical prediction exactly, and real LLMs follow the same incentives when they are made explicit. The main design implication is simple: under partial verification, factor-level explanation systems should include a report-independent audit component so that under-reporting cannot be used to avoid scrutiny.
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2610.01514 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2610.01514v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.01514 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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