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This study reveals that in multi-agent systems involving LLMs, susceptibility to deception scales linearly with the proportion of bad-faith actors rather than total group size, making simple scaling an ineffective defense strategy. Unlike human conformity studies where a majority is needed to sway opinion, honest agents frequently defect even when deceivers remain a minority, highlighting unique vulnerabilities in automated deliberation. Furthermore, the research notes that private coordination among adversaries can reduce their effectiveness, suggesting potential structural countermeasures for robust agent design.
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How does Adversarial Influence Scale in Multi-Agent Systems?

arXiv2 min read

arXiv:2609.30028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent deliberation can improve performance, but what happens when some agents do not act in good faith? In practice, an agent may be deceptive and work to subvert the group, whether through its own objectives or external instruction. We study how susceptibility to deception scales as groups increase in size and deceivers become more prevalent. It is not the number of agents in the group that matters, but the proportion of deceivers. We observe that the defection rate, how often initially correct agents switch to an incorrect final answer, rises linearly with this proportion. Whereas humans in comparable conformity studies are reliably swayed only when misleading confederates form a majority, LLM agents defect regularly even when deceivers remain a minority. Susceptibility also depends on which models are interacting, especially on the honest agent side. Unexpectedly, allowing deceivers to coordinate privately can make them less effective. Altogether, our results show that adding more agents is therefore not a sufficient defense, because the adversary can simply scale with the group.

Title:How does Adversarial Influence Scale in Multi-Agent Systems?

Abstract:Multi-agent deliberation can improve performance, but what happens when some agents do not act in good faith? In practice, an agent may be deceptive and work to subvert the group, whether through its own objectives or external instruction. We study how susceptibility to deception scales as groups increase in size and deceivers become more prevalent. It is not the number of agents in the group that matters, but the proportion of deceivers. We observe that the defection rate, how often initially correct agents switch to an incorrect final answer, rises linearly with this proportion. Whereas humans in comparable conformity studies are reliably swayed only when misleading confederates form a majority, LLM agents defect regularly even when deceivers remain a minority. Susceptibility also depends on which models are interacting, especially on the honest agent side. Unexpectedly, allowing deceivers to coordinate privately can make them less effective. Altogether, our results show that adding more agents is therefore not a sufficient defense, because the adversary can simply scale with the group.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY)

arXiv:2609.30028 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2609.30028v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.30028 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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Full text under the publisher's open licence · 274 words

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